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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a doctor who has a moral objection to the use of birth
control pills. A patient comes to him seeking a prescription for the pill,
but he tries to discourage her. He exaggerates its risks to her health, and
he tells her that she may experience various side effects even where there
is no scientific evidence of such effects. During their conversation, he
tells her graphic details about another form of birth control, tubal liga-
tion surgery, and shows her photographs of such a surgery being
performed-even though the patient expressed no interest in tubal liga-
tion and in fact said she did not want to hear about the surgery once the
doctor brought it up. Finally, he tells her that birth control is morally
wrong. At the end of this conversation, the patient tells the doctor that
she has considered her options and the information the doctor gave her
and is ready to proceed with the pill. However, the doctor sends the pa-
tient home to think it over, telling her she must wait at least one day.
Because of the patient's work and child care obligations, she is not able
to return to the doctor's office for her prescription until the following
week.
This doctor's actions would strike many people as morally wrong.
He has used deception, frightening and medically irrelevant infor-
mation, and the practical obstacle of delay to try to prevent his patient
from obtaining a medication-all as ways of imposing his moral view on
the patient. In fact, there is an ethical doctrine that regulates the practice
of medicine that can be used to evaluate the moral character of the doc-
tor's actions: that of informed consent. At its heart, the doctrine requires
that health care professionals provide their patients with sufficient in-
formation to allow them to make an intelligent decision as to whether to
undergo a medical intervention, and that the patient's decision deter-
mines whether the patient undergoes the intervention.
If we slightly change the facts of the story about the discouraging
doctor, it becomes a story that happens every day. Abortion patients face
attempts to discourage them from terminating their pregnancies like
those the imaginary doctor used, as well as others-and state laws man-
date these attempts. While the law of every state requires health care
professionals to secure the informed consent of the patient before any
medical intervention, over half of the states place additional require-
ments on legally effective informed consent for abortion. These laws
sometimes include features that have ethical problems, such as giving
patients deceptive information.
Such laws are part of anti-abortion activists' strategy to chip away at
the legal availability of abortion in the United States by heavily regulating
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the practice of providing abortions. These laws are examples of abortion
exceptionalism, in which abortion is singled out for more restrictive
government regulation as compared to other, similar procedures.' Vari-
ous justifications are offered for abortion-specific regulations, but at
heart they are driven by moral opposition to abortion and legislators'
desire to come as close as possible to banning it without enacting a law
that will be struck down as unconstitutional.
Unique informed consent requirements for abortion are depicted
by their supporters as necessary for fully informed and voluntary con-
sent to abortion. They are purported to protect health by regulating the
practice of medicine. But their worst features are detrimental both to the
goals of the doctrine of informed consent and to women's health. I refer
to these laws as "biased counseling laws" because they are not intended
to ensure that patients give their informed consent to abortion, but ra-
ther are intended to make women less likely to terminate their
pregnancy. I employ a broad definition of biased counseling laws; for my
purposes, any law that is intended to discourage women from deciding
to obtain abortions is a biased counseling law. However, not all abor-
tion-specific consent laws are equally ethically problematic. Thus, my
argument will focus on certain features of biased counseling laws.
This Article contributes to the literature by examining in detail the
most problematic features of biased counseling laws, collecting and ex-
plaining some of the most influential ethical accounts of informed
consent, and demonstrating the deep ethical problems with biased coun-
seling laws. Legal scholars have previously argued that biased counseling
laws are unconstitutional because they impose an undue burden on the
right to terminate a pregnancy,2 they violate the First Amendment,' and
1. As one court explained, "first trimester abortions are less likely to result in complica-
tions than many other surgical procedures that are routinely performed in doctor's
offices. Loop electrical excision procedures, regular diagnostic D & C's, hysteroscopy,
diagnostic laparoscopy, genetic amniocentesis and laser procedures all pose risks to
women equal to or greater than first trimester abortions." Tenn. Dep't of Health v.
Boyle, No. M2001-01738-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31840685, at *7 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 19, 2002) (invalidating statute requiring providers of a "substantial num-
ber" of abortions to acquire a license).
2. See, e.g., Sarah E. Weber, Comment, An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultra-
sounds as the Newest Tactic in Anti-Abortion Legislation, 45 TULSA L. REv. 359,
366-72 (2009) (arguing that an Oklahoma bill requiring an ultrasound before an
abortion violates women's due process right to obtain abortions).
3. See, e.g., Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of
Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 939 (2007); Sarah Runels, Note,
Informed Consent Laws and the Constitution: Balancing State Interests with a Physi-
cian's First Amendment Rights and a Woman's Due Process Rights, 26 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 185, 194-98 (2009) (arguing that biased counseling laws constitute
2012] 3
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER 6- LAW
they constitute sex discrimination.4 This Article shows that, in addition
to their shortcomings when judged by the standards of the Constitu-
tion, biased counseling laws have serious problems when judged by the
standards of medical ethics. The Article provides an innovative, interdis-
ciplinary analysis of statutory provisions in an area in which legislatures
have been highly active in recent years and will likely continue to be.
Part I sketches the legal doctrine of informed consent, which con-
stitutes useful background for understanding the related ethical doctrine
and illustrates the baseline of general informed consent requirements
that abortion-specific laws go beyond. The ways in which biased coun-
seling laws exceed general informed consent requirements are an
example of abortion exceptionalism, the strategy of regulating abortion
more stringently than similar medical procedures in order to decrease
patients' access to the procedure. Part I also draws attention to Supreme
Court decisions discussing informed consent to abortion that contain
the troubling beliefs held by supporters of biased counseling laws. Part
II describes several biased counseling laws, pointing out specific features
that have medical ethical significance. Part III surveys several well-
developed, influential accounts of informed consent from the field of
medical ethics, as well as the positions of two medical professional asso-
ciations. I apply each of them to the features of biased counseling laws
that are discussed in Part I and argue that none of them provides a justi-
fication for the problematic features of biased counseling laws. In fact,
those features of biased counseling laws are deeply flawed according to
all the ethics authorities this Article examines.
I. THE LEGAL CONTEXT
A. The Legal Doctrine ofInformed Consent
The tort doctrine of informed consent in the United States was de-
veloped in the common law in the early twentieth century, although it
compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment); see also Caroline Mala
Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. REv.
939, 1007-11 (2009) (arguing that some biased counseling laws violate an as-yet un-
recognized right against compelled listening).
4. See Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-
Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991 (2007) (arguing that the
woman-protective justifications offered for a South Dakota abortion ban and biased
counseling law are based on unconstitutional gender stereotypes).
4 [Vol. 19:1
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has since been codified in many states.! The doctrine has shifted in its
legal consequences; initially, a doctor's failure to obtain informed con-
sent created a cause of action sounding in battery, protecting the
patient's bodily integrity,6 but the cause of action later generally came to
be thought of as sounding in negligence.
The key element of informed consent is that the doctor must dis-
close material risks to the patient. About half the states define "material
risks" as those that a reasonable person would likely find significant "in
deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy,"' while the oth-
er half defines the term by reference to professional practice and what a
reasonable physician would disclose.9 Under the doctrine, the decision
belongs to the patient: patients have the right to refuse medical inter-
ventions.'o Thus, informed consent is "the legal recognition of the
medical patient's protectable interest in autonomous decisionmaking.""
The fundamental value undergirding the doctrine is generally consid-
ered to be patient autonomy.12 There are four widely-recognized
exceptions to the requirement that a physician obtain informed consent
to a medical intervention: emergencies; patient incompetence; patient
waiver; and therapeutic privilege, a doctrine that allows doctors to re-
frain from making a disclosure where it will seriously harm the patient.
5. See RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAucHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED
CONSENT 139-40 (1986) (discussing the development of statutory law of informed
consent).
6. See, e.g., Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905).
7. See, e.g., Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960).
8. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
9. See Tom L. BEAuciAP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
122-23 (6th ed. 2009); JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEO-
RY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 46-51 (2d ed. 2001).
10. See, e.g., Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1104 ("Anglo-American law starts with the premise
of thorough-going self determination. It follows that each man is considered to be
master of his own body, and he may, if he be of sound mind, expressly prohibit the
performance of life-saving surgery, or other medical treatment.").
11. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 605 (Cal. 1993); see also Alan Meisel, The "Excep-
tions" to the Informed Consent Doctrine: Striking a Balance Between Competing Values
in Medical Decisionmaking, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 413, 420 (1979) (arguing that "[t]he
purpose of requiring the patient's consent to treatment is to protect his physical and
psychic integrity against unwanted invasions, and to permit the patient to act as an
autonomous, self-determining human being").
12. The value of individual autonomy also grounds the right to privacy under the United
States Constitution, which protects "a person's most basic decisions about family and
parenthood," Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992), as
well as the "constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment," Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
13. See Meisel, supra note 11, at 433. Canterbury includes an early articulation of the
therapeutic privilege. 464 F.2d at 788-89.
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Other sources of law buttress the tort doctrine requiring informed
consent for medical treatment. Although the two are distinct, "there is
quite a bit of convergence between the principles underlying the tort law
doctrine of informed consent and the constitutional right of privacy.""
Both doctrines are undergirded by the value of individual autonomy. In
addition, the right not to be subjected to medical treatment without
one's informed consent is a human right that is guaranteed to individu-
als in the United States by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR")." The ICCPR requires states parties to en-
sure that patients give "full and informed consent" to medical
procedures.16
The legal doctrine of informed consent and the ethical doctrine of
informed consent are analytically distinct, although they have been in-
tertwined in their historical development. It is conceptually possible for
the legal doctrine to place an obligation on doctors that the ethical doc-
trine is silent upon or even prohibits." Since this Article argues that
biased counseling laws violate the ethical doctrine, I will not analyze the
legal doctrine in any detail.
B. Abortion Exceptionalism
Since every state has generally-applicable informed consent laws,
statutes that require more involved consent protocols are an example of
abortion exceptionalism." This is the anti-abortion legislator's strategy
to decrease the number of abortions by placing onerous regulations on
abortion where similar procedures are unregulated, making abortions
more difficult and more expensive to provide." Abortion providers often
14. Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-
Making, 16 DuKE J. GENDER L. & PoL'Y 223, 262-63 (2009).
15. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
16. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: Slovakia 12 CCPR/CO/78/SVK (Aug. 22, 2003).
17. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMM. Op. No. 439, INFORMED
CONSENT 2 (2009) [hereinafter INFORMED CONSENT], available at http://www.
acog.org/Resources AndPublications/CommitteeOpinions/Committee.onEthics
/InformedConsent (noting the distinction between legal and ethical informed con-
sent requirements).
18. Although I am sure I did not invent this term, I am not aware of any prior use of it in
the legal literature.
19. See Cynthia Soohoo & Jordan Goldberg, The Full Realization of Our Rights: The
Right to Health in State Constitutions, 60 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 997, 1062-63
(2010). In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d
1025 (D. Neb. 2010), the court held that a Nebraska statute's requirements on abor-
6 [Vol. 19: 1
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face more stringent regulations than other health care providers-such
as physician's offices or outpatient surgery facilities-that have similar
risk profiles. Abortion providers are often required to obtain licenses, be
subject to inspections, maintain certain written policies, and meet phys-
ical plant requirements-even where other health care providers are
not.20 While most regulation of the medical profession is enforced only
by professional sanctions such as disciplinary action by a licensing body,
abortion regulations are often backed by the threat of criminal penalties,
including prison sentences.2 1 Provisions like the federal Hyde Amend-
ment2 2 and similar state laws23 prohibit public funds from being used to
pay for abortions, on the basis that taxpayers who oppose abortion
should not have to pay for it. 24 However, there are no similar provisions
prohibiting taxpayer money from funding other activities that are mor-
ally offensive to large numbers of Americans, such as the production of
highly destructive military weaponry.
The popularity of laws that create unique requirements for legally
effective informed consent to abortion stands in contrast to the rarity of
informed consent laws specific to other procedures. Some states have
tion providers, including putative informed consent requirements, were so onerous
that the only interpretation of the statute was that it was "intended to place a sub-
stantial, if not insurmountable, obstacle in the path of any woman seeking an
abortion[.]" Id. at 1046. The court also noted the exceptionalism of the abortion law,
pointing out that "[n]o such legislative concern for the health of women, or of men,
has given rise to any remotely similar informed-consent statutes applicable to other
medical procedures, ... regardless of whether such procedures pose an equal or great-
er threat to the physical, mental, and emotional health of the patient." Id. at 1044.
20. See generally Center for Reproductive Rights, Targeted Regulation ofAbortion Provid-
ers: Avoiding the "TRAP", 2-4 (2003), http://reproductiverights.org/sites/
crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub-bp-avoidingthetrap.pdf (describing regula-
tions specific to abortion providers in various states).
21. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-32-01(5) (2011), 14-02.1-04(4), (5) (2011)
(providing that a physician's failure to ensure that an abortion patient is offered the
opportunity to view an ultrasound is a misdemeanor punishable by one year in prison
or a $2,000 fine, or both).
22. Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434. Congress has
passed a version of this appropriations rider prohibiting the use of federal funds to
pay for abortions every year since 1976.
23. For example, Arizona law prohibits state money from being used to pay for abortions.
Asuz. REv. STAT. § 35-196.02(A) (2011). In 2011, the legislature expanded this ban
to prohibit public funds going to "any person or entity who provides, pays for, pro-
motes, provides coverage of or provides referrals for abortions." H.R. 2384, 50th
Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2011).
24. See, e.g., 139 Cong. Rec. 22,629 (1993) (discussing the Hyde Amendment and stat-
ing: "Forcing ... millions of pro-life Americans to pay for abortion on demand with
their tax dollars would be a gross violation of their freedom of conscience.")
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informed consent statutes specific to sterilization. 25 Some states have
laws specific to breast cancer treatment, and some show special concern
for psychological treatments like electroconvulsive therapy and psycho-
tropic drugs.26 Other statutes provide specific disclosure requirements
for telemedicine,27 which is the provision of medicine remotely through
the use of telecommunications, or for umbilical cord blood banking.28
Interestingly, unique application to women or reproduction is a feature
of most of these areas of special regulation of consent. Sterilization is
one area where the state shows its desire to regulate reproduction and
specifically to protect childbearing capacity, just as it does in the abor-
tion context. Two others involve medical circumstances faced only or
primarily by women, breast cancer and umbilical cord blood banking.
This gender distinction fits with the. notion that women need special
protection in their medical decision making, which is an important as-
pect of anti-abortion policy making, as I discuss in the next section.
C The Constitutional Right to Abortion and Views
of Women's Decision Making
The United States Constitution protects the right to terminate a
pregnancy.29 The constitutionality of laws that impact the right to abor-
tion is judged by the "undue burden" standard articulated in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.o The Supreme Court's
abortion jurisprudence in Casey and since touches on informed consent
principles and women's autonomy. Apparent in these decisions is a trou-
bling strain of paternalism and distrust of women's decision-making
ability. The Court's use of these ideas in decisions regarding which forms
of abortion regulation are constitutionally permissible helps illustrate
how such regulation in the form of biased counseling laws conflicts with
the doctrine of informed consent.
Casey departed from prior Supreme Court decisions by enhancing
the government's "interest in promoting the life or potential life of the
unborn."" The plurality reasoned that, while the government may con-
stitutionally act to further an interest in potential life by persuading
women to choose childbirth over abortion, the means it uses "must be
25. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5701 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 436.225 (2011).
26. FADEN & BEAucHAMp, supra note 5, at 140.
27. See, e.g., OILA. STAT. tit. 36, § 6804 (2011).
28. See, e.g., OIKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2175 (2011).
29. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
31. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870 (plurality opinion).
[Vol. 19:18
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calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder it."3 2 One of
the many restrictions in the Pennsylvania abortion law that was upheld
in Casey was a biased counseling provision.33 The statute requires that,
twenty-four hours before an abortion, a woman must be "orally in-
formed" of the gestational age of the embryo or fetus and of the nature
and risks of the procedure and alternatives,34 and must be offered state-
produced materials that "describe the unborn child and list agencies
which offer alternatives to abortion,"" among other disclosures.
The Casey plurality had no trouble upholding the risk disclosure,
approving the requirement to give "truthful, nonmisleading infor-
mation" about the procedure and its risks. But the following language,
which appears in the portion of the plurality opinion upholding disclo-
sures about gestational age and fetal development, reveals the plurality's
view of women's capacity to decide whether to terminate their pregnan-
cies:
[It cannot] be doubted that most women considering an abor-
tion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not
dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a
woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the
State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a
woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with dev-
astating psychological consequences, that her decision was not
fully informed.36
The plurality's statement contains wholly unsupported empirical claims
about what women think. In addition, the plurality writes as if the law
requires disclosure of the consequences of an abortion to the embryo or
fetus," when it is common knowledge that an abortion results in its de-
struction. The disclosure at issue is not about what the consequences are,
but what the embryo or fetus looks like, information which is not clearly
32. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. The protection of the health of pregnant women is also a
permissible purpose for abortion regulations. Id. at 846 (plurality opinion).
33. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205 (1989).
34. Id. at § 3205(a)(1).
35. Id. at § 3205(a)(2)(i).
36. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882.
37. Although the term "fetus" is typically used in discussions of abortion to the exclusion
of "embryo," the vast majority of abortions in the United States occur at stages of
pregnancy when the former term is inappropriate. The fetal period begins at the end
of the tenth week of pregnancy, and approximately 80% of abortions are performed
at earlier gestational ages. See GUTTMACHER INST., FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN
THE UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb
induced.abortion.pdf.
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relevant to patients' decisions." Finally and most importantly, the plu-
rality betrays its skepticism about women's decision-making ability and
autonomy by assuming that it is appropriate for the state to protect
women from their putative inability to think through their own deci-
sions and then face the consequences of those decisions."
Turning to the Pennsylvania law's waiting period, the Casey plurali-
ty said: "The idea that important decisions will be more informed and
deliberate if they follow some period of reflection does not strike us as
unreasonable, particularly where the statute directs that important in-
formation become part of the background of the decision."'5 We should
ask, what is the problem the state is addressing here? Why do policy-
makers believe that women are unable to take sufficient time to make
the decision on their own and need to be forced to sleep on it?" What is
more, informed consent is a doctrine designed to help patients make
decisions when they need medical information to decide. among treat-
ment options, but the decision of whether to bear a child goes far
beyond that. Yet Casey treats the state's disapproval of abortion as if it
were as relevant as the medical risks. Even if the state has a legitimate
interest in discouraging abortion, that does not entail that it is appropri-
ate to use the informed consent process to express that interest or
intrude upon the relationship between doctor and patient.4 2
38. This point shows the Casey plurality's analogy to the kidney transplant beneficiary
who wants to know what the risks are to the donor, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 883, to be
a complete non sequitur. No one who is mentally capable of consenting to an abor-
tion is unaware that abortion results in the termination of a pregnancy. Of course,
some women may think that the means by which the embryo or fetus is destroyed
and removed is relevant to their decision. Under the general doctrine of informed
consent, those women are free to ask for that information and health care profession-
als are obliged to disclose it. But some biased counseling laws require all patients to
receive the same information, regardless of their wishes.
39. This strain of thought runs counter to the Court's sex discrimination jurisprudence.
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (stating that the justification
for a law "must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, ca-
pacities, or preferences of males and females"); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) ("[I]f the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect'
members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handi-
cap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate.").
40. Casey, 505 U.S. at 885.
41. Cf Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 23 (Tenn.
2000) (quoting trial court's statement that "[tihe, majority of the expert testimony
seemed to acquiesce in the fact that most women have seriously contemplated their
decision before making their appointment").
42. See Manian, supra note 14, at 251 (arguing that allowing the state to "pressure wom-
en to choose childbirth over abortion" contradicts the purposes of informed consent).
[Vol. 19:110
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In its most recent abortion decision, Gonzales v. Carhart, the Su-
preme Court upheld the so-called Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2003 against constitutional challenge." This federal statute places a
criminal prohibition on some methods of abortion." The physicians
challenging the act argued, inter alia, that it placed an unconstitutional
undue burden on the right to abortion by imposing a substantial obsta-
cle in the path of women seeking abortions. Carhart cited Casey for the
proposition that the state does not impose an undue burden on the
abortion right with "[r]egulations which do no more than create a struc-
tural mechanism by which the State ... may express profound respect
for the life of the unborn . . . , if they are not a substantial obstacle to
the woman's exercise of the right to choose."A The Court found that the
statute's prohibition on abortion methods that involve the partial re-
moval of a fetus from the uterus before fetal demise was justified by the
government's interest in showing its "profound respect for the life within
the woman. 46 The Court accepted congressional findings that proce-
dures that are similar to infanticide should be prohibited in order to
maintain a bright line between abortion and infanticide.
In addition to the government's interest in protecting the dignity of
human life by proscribing certain methods of terminating pregnancies,
the Court found that the government's interest in protecting women
from the consequences of their own actions was a purpose that helped
keep the statute from imposing a substantial obstacle. Like Casey, Car-
hart made bold assertions without statistical support and even
acknowledged doing so: "While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come
to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sus-
tained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow." 8 It is alarming
that the mere possibility that some individuals might regret an act can
be part of the government's justification for criminalizing it. It is "unex-
ceptionable" to conclude that some people regret getting married or
divorced, but no one would argue that this is a reason for either to be
criminalized, both because the proportion of regretful people is presum-
ably small and because people have a fundamental right to control their
43. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 168 (2007).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2003).
45. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 146 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 877).
46. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 157.
47. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158.
48. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (internal citation omitted) (citing Brief for Sandra Cano et
al. as Amici Curiae in No. 05-380, pp. 22-24 (quoting women who attributed emo-
tional problems to having had abortions)).
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family lives,49 even where they may come to regret their decisions. Both
reasons apply equally well to abortion.o
Even more alarming-and germane to informed consent-the
Court found another justification for the ban in the following string of
possibilities: doctors might not describe the details of the procedure in
question to their patients, some patients might later learn of those details,
and some of those patients might experience serious grief and sorrow. The
last step in this imagined scenario, that a woman who regrets her abortion
"must" face deeper grief and sorrow once she discovers the details of the
procedure, was characterized as "self-evident" by the Court," even though
it is an empirical proposition that demands supporting evidence like any
other claim about human psychology. Bafflingly, the Carhart Court used
an informed consent justification to uphold not a requirement of robust
disclosures, but a criminal ban on a safe procedure. This ban restricts
patients' autonomy, rather than protecting it.52 As Justice Ginsburg put
it in her dissent: "Eliminating or reducing women's reproductive choices
is manifestly not a means of protecting them."" The Court's mistaken
argument is a particularly transparent example of the anti-abortion
strategy of using the idea of informed consent to justify regulation that
does nothing to protect the values that informed consent serves: the
provision of information and the enabling of autonomous choice. Ra-
ther, the anti-abortion strategy uses informed consent as an obstacle to
54abortion access.
49. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) ("[T]he right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals."); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371,
382 (1971) (describing marriage as one of the basic values of society); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[T]he rights to
marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as
the fundamental rights specifically protected.").
50. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (plurality opinion) (affirming the central holding of
Roe). See also BRENDA MAJOR ET AL., Am. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass'N., REPORT OF THE
APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION 81 (2008) [hereinafter APA
TASK FORCE REPORT] available at http://www.apa.org/pi/women/programslabortion/
mental-health.pdf (reporting findings that most women are satisfied with their deci-
sion to have an abortion).
51. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159-60 ("It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret
her choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more pro-
found when she learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that she
allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her un-
born child, a child assuming the human form.")
52. See Manian, supra note 14, at 257 ("The Court's concern for informed decision-
making hardly seems genuine when its solution denies decision-making altogether.").
53. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 184 n.9 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54. See, e.g., supra note 19 (discussing Nebraska law).
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These examples show the Court's willingness to accept the notion
that women's decision-making abilities are deficient, which is supposed
to justify forcing women to receive certain information, to endure
mandatory waiting periods, and to have some options taken away from
them altogether. Unsupported assumptions about future regret become
reasons to restrict women's actions, despite the fact that various life
choices people make may become a source of regret. The power of self-
determination that principles of liberty grant to individuals entails a
requirement that individuals face the consequences of their actions. In-
formed consent, a doctrine designed to facilitate self-determination
through the provision of the information needed to make a decision, is
manipulated in the service of the political goal of restricting abortion.
That this is the political goal of biased counseling statutes will become
clear as Part II describes these statutes and explains the ways they are
intended to discourage abortions. Legislatures have been encouraged by
the fact that the Supreme Court upheld Pennsylvania's biased counseling
in Casey, as well as the mistrust of women apparent in the Court's deci-
sions, to enact biased counseling laws that go far beyond the
Pennsylvania statute that was before the Court in 1992.
II. BIASED COUNSELING LAWS
Over half of the states have laws that specifically regulate the in-
formed consent process for abortion, placing requirements on providers
and patients that are more demanding than for any other medical pro-
cedure." These laws are intended to discourage women from choosing
to terminate their pregnancies. Part II discusses examples of the most
troubling features of these laws: they intend to discourage abortions,
reveal disdain for women's decision making, and are based on false views
of the medical facts. Part III will argue that these characteristics of bi-
ased counseling laws violate medical ethics.
A. False or Misleading Statements About Risks
Several states' biased counseling laws require that health care pro-
viders make statements to patients about specific risks, such as infertility
55. See Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, State Abortion Counseling Policies and the
Fundamental Principles of Informed Consent, GurrMACHER POL'y REv., Fall 2007, at
6, 7-9, available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/4/gprO0406. In addi-
tion to the twenty-three states listed by Gold and Nash in 2007, at least four states
have since enacted biased counseling laws: Arizona, Florida, Indiana, and Missouri.
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or psychological problems, in order to properly "inform" the patients'
consent. Some of these risk statements are exaggerated, misleading, or
simply false.
1. Infertility
Statutes in several states require abortion patients to be told of a
risk of infertility when medically accurate." However, some states do
not include qualifications about medical accuracy or specificity regard-
ing the patient's procedure. The Texas counseling booklet for patients
states that complications of abortion "may make it difficult or impos-
sible to become pregnant in the future or carry a pregnancy to term.
State-produced materials that must be offered to patients in South
Dakota state that infertility is a risk of abortion, without any qualifica-
tion."
However, studies have found that there is no association between in-
duced abortion and later infertility." The most common first-trimester
abortion method, vacuum aspiration, "poses virtually no long-term risk of
infertility, ectopic pregnancy, spontaneous abortion or congenital mal-
formation."'o Some complications of abortion may implicate future
61
reproduction, but complications are rare.
56. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-327(1)(a) (2011) (preliminarily enjoined in part by
Planned Parenthood of the Heartland v. Heineman, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Neb.
2010)); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(8)(a)(3) (2011); W. VA. CODE § 16-21-
2(a)(1) (2011); Wis. STAT. § 253.10(3)(c)(1)(f) (2011) (listing infertility as a risk that
patients must be informed of). Pennsylvania requires mention of infertility by regula-
tion. 28 PA. CODE § 29.37(b)(1)(iii) (2011).
57. TEx. DEP'T OF HEALTH, A WoMAN's RIGHT TO KNow 17 (2003), available at
http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/wrtk/pdflbooklet.pdf.
58. S.D. Dep't of Health, Induced Abortion Methods and Risks, http://
doh.sd.gov/abortion/risks/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2012); see also Gold & Nash, supra
note 55, at 6, 11.
59. See Hani K. Atrash & Carol J. Rowland Hogue, The Effect ofPregnancy Termination
on Future Reproduction, 4 BALLIhRE'S CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 391
(1990).
60. Gold & Nash, supra note 55, at 6, 11.
61. S.K. Henshaw, Unintended Pregnancy and Abortion: A Public Health Perspective, in A
CLINICIAN'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL AND SURGICAL ABORTION 11 (Paul M et al. eds.,
1999); see also David A. Grimes & Mitchell D. Creinin, Induced Abortion: An Over-
view for Internists, 140 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 620, 620 (2004) (finding that
induced abortion does not lead to medical problems in the long term).
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2. Psychological Consequences
Many states' laws require health care providers to tell patients about
the emotional or psychological consequences of having an abortion.62
Several states' biased counseling materials note that women who obtain
abortions may feel a range of emotions, from sadness to relief,63 a state-
ment that is of course trivially true of many significant life events. These
laws require doctors to tell all of their patients, vastly most of whom are
competent adults, that there may be emotional consequences to the de-
cision to terminate their pregnancies. Anti-abortion legislators believe
that women need to be told this because they likely espouse an unjusti-
fiable skepticism about women's moral reasoning and decision-making
abilities.
Some states' biased counseling laws and materials claim that abor-
tion can result in specific negative emotions and serious psychological
problems. In Michigan, the counseling materials that must be given to
every patient are required by statute to "[s]tate that as the result of an
abortion, some women may experience depression, feelings of guilt,
sleep disturbance, loss of interest in work or sex, or anger."66 In West
Virginia, counseling materials that must be offered to abortion patients6
state that "[m]any women suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Syndrome following abortion. PTSD is a psychological dysfunction re-
sulting from a traumatic experience."" The materials provide a long list
of symptoms that includes depression, drug abuse, eating disorders,
"chronic relationship problems," and "suicidal thoughts or acts," among
62. For example, Nevada's biased counseling statute requires that a health care professional
"[e]xplain the physical and emotional implications of having the abortion." NEV. REV.
STAT. § 4 4 2.253(1)(c) (2011); see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.027(1)(1)(b)(b) (2011)
(requiring providers to inform patients, in person, of "possible adverse psychological
effects associated with the abortion"). In 2011, North Dakota added a statutory re-
quirement that its counseling materials discuss "the possible adverse psychological
effects associated with an abortion." N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02.1(1)(d) (2011).
The law apparently requires that these materials be given to abortion patients. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(8)(b)(2) (2011).
63. Gold & Nash, supra note 55, at 6, 11.
64. Id. (listing South Dakota, Texas, Utah, and West Virginia).
65. MICH. COMP. LAws § 333.17015(3) (2011).
66. MICH. COMP. LAws § 333.17015(11)(b)(iii) (2011).
67. W. VA. CODE § 16 -21-2(a), (b)(4) (2011).
68. W. VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN REs., INFORMATION ON FETAL DEVELOPMENT,
ABORTION AND ADOPTION 15, available at http://www.wvdhhr.org/wrtk/
wrtkbooklet.pdf.
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other things. South Dakota's biased counseling statute required that
abortion patients be told about the "known medical risks" of abortion,
including an "[i]ncreased risk of suicide ideation and suicide,"70 but that
requirement has been struck down because they are not "known" risks of
abortion." In addition, some states' counseling materials mention psy-
72
chological risks, even when they are not required to by statute.
The best scientific evidence shows that there is no causal relation-
ship between abortion and psychological problems." Many studies to
the contrary have been found to have methodological problems. There
is an association between abortion and mental health problems, but stud-
ies show that the association is due to common causal factors.7 ' That is,
factors that place women at higher risk of mental problems also increase
the risk that they will experience unwanted pregnancies and obtain
69. Id The statute governing the production of these counseling materials requires that
the materials "contain objective information describing . . . the possible detrimental
psychological effects of abortion." W. VA. CODE § 16-21-3(a)(2) (2011).
70. S.D. CODIFIED LAws §§ 34-23A-10.1, 34-23A-10.3 (2011).
71. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 653 F.3d 662, 673 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding
warning of suicide and suicidal ideation violated patients' due process rights and doc-
tors' First Amendment rights "[b]y compelling untruthful and misleading speech"),
vacated in part pending reh' en banc by 662 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2011).
72. See, e.g., TEx. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 57, at 16. The booklet goes on to
recommend that women receive counseling at one of the crisis pregnancy centers
listed in another state-produced booklet that must be offered to abortion patients.
Id. Crisis pregnancy centers are dedicated to discouraging pregnant women from
getting abortions. See generally MINORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON Gov'T REFORM,
109TH CONG., FALSE AND MISLEADING HEALTH INFORMATION PROVIDED BY
FEDERALLY FUNDED PREGNANCY RESOURCE CENTERS (2006), available at
http://waxman.house.gov/UploadedFiles/FALSEANDMISLEADINGHEALTH
INFORMATION.pdf.
73. Trine Munk-Olsen et al., Induced First-Trimester Abortion and Risk of Mental Disor-
der, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 332, 332 (2011) (finding no increase in likelihood of
contact with psychiatric services for mental disorder after induced abortion but find-
ing a slight increase after childbirth); Brenda Major et al., Abortion and Mental
Health, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 863, 885 (2009) ("[T]he relative risk of mental health
problems among adult women who have a single, legal, first-trimester abortion of an
unwanted pregnancy for nontherapeutic reasons is no greater than the risk among
women who deliver an unwanted pregnancy."); Post, supra note 3, at 962-66 (col-
lecting authorities refuting the existence of "Post-Abortion Syndrome," a spurious
emotional condition supposedly caused by abortion); Siegel, supra note 4, 1011 n.92
(collecting studies).
74. APA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 50, at 15-20.
75. See, e.g., Julia R. Steinberg & Lawrence B. Finer, Examining the Association ofAbor-
tion History and Current Mental Health: A Reanalysis of the National Comorbidity
Survey Using a Common-Risk-Factors Model, 72 Soc. Sa. & MED. 72 (2010) (con-
cluding that the common-risk-factor explanation of the association between abortion
and mental disorder is supported by the evidence, and the abortion-as-trauma expla-
nation is not).
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abortions. This association is not evidence that having an abortion caus-
es later psychological problems, 6 but rather that both are caused by
previously-existing factors. In sum, "the most powerful predictor of a
woman's mental state after an abortion is her mental state before the
abortion." In addition, women who seek abortions are by definition
experiencing an unwanted pregnancy, which is itself a stressful circum-
stance that may exacerbate psychological problems.
What is more, the warnings in biased counseling statutes are not
accompanied by similar warnings about the mental health consequences
of childbirth, such as post-partum depression, which poses a significant
risk. Studies show that becoming a parent can increase the risk of de-
pression and other mental-health problems."o
While it is true that some women experience negative emotional re-
sponses to their abortions, this is also true of many medical
interventions and other types of life events."' However, the laws surveyed
above exaggerate the likelihood and severity of the risks. The putative
patient-protective benefit of these laws is premised on the idea that
women cannot predict their feelings after abortion and need to be in-
formed that they may suffer negative emotional consequences. By
76. Major et al., supra note 73, at 885 ("[T]he claim that observed associations between
abortion history and a mental health problem are caused by the abortion per se, as op-
posed to other factors, is not supported by the existing evidence.").
77. Understanding Postpartum Depression: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 21 (2004) (statement of Dr. Nada
Stotland) ("The psychological outcome of abortion is optimized when women are
able to make decisions on the basis of their own values, beliefs and circumstances, free
from pressure or coercion, and to have those decisions supported by their families,
friends and society in general.").
78. A recent review of the literature suggested: "An unwanted pregnancy was associated
with an increased risk of mental health problems." ACAD. OF MED. ROYAL COLLS.,
INDUCED ABORTION AND MENTAL HEALTH 8 (2011); see also id. at 125 ("When a
woman has an unwanted pregnancy, rates of mental health problems will be largely
unaffected whether she has an abortion or goes on to give birth.").
79. See, e.g., B.N. GAYNES, ET AL., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PERINATAL DE-
PRESSION: PREVALENCE, SCREENING ACCuRACY, AND SCREENING OuTcoMES (2005).
80. Bonnie Rochman, Having an Abortion Doesn't Lead to Depression, TIME, Jan. 28, 2011,
http://healthland.time.com/2011/01/28/having-an-abortion-doesnt-lead-to-depression.
81. See Major et al., supra note 73, at 885 ("Some women feel confident they made the
right choice and feel no regret; others experience sadness, grief, guilt, and feelings of
loss following the elective termination of a pregnancy. Some women experience clini-
cally significant outcomes, such as depression or anxiety."); see also Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 183 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating that, "for
most women, abortion is a painfully difficult decision" but citing evidence that hav-
ing an abortion is not more harmful to long-term psychological health than having
an unintended child).
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focusing on negative psychological risks, these laws attempt to use fear
to discourage women from terminating their pregnancies.
3. Breast Cancer
In a handful of states, statutes require that patients be told that
having an abortion increases their risk of breast cancer when it is medi-
cally accurate.82 In Alaska," Oklahoma," and Texas," state-produced
materials that must be either given or offered to abortion patients claim
that there is a possible link between abortion and breast cancer. 6 In
2011, North Dakota added a statutory requirement that its counseling
materials discuss "the possible increased risk of breast cancer.""
While scientific studies have produced inconsistent results as to
whether abortion increases the risk of breast cancer, the methodology of
many of the studies that apparently show a link has been criticized. These
82. MINN. STAT. §§ 145.4242, 145.4243 (2011); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-33(1)(a)(ii)
(2011); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-20-104(5), -106 (2011); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. %§ 171.011, 171.012 (West 2011).
83. See Alaska Dep't of Health and Soc. Servs., Making a Decision About Your Pregnancy,
http://www.hss.state.ak.us/dph/wcfhlinformedconsent/abortion/risks.htm (last visit-
ed Apr. 3, 2012) (noting a statement from the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists that there is no increased risk, as well as the position of the American
Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists that there is a causal relation-
ship).
84. OI.A. BD. OF MED. LICENSURE AND SUPERVISION, A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO KNow 14
(2006), available at http://www.awomansright.org/pdf/AWRTK Booklet-English-
sm.pdf (stating that some "studies indicate that there might be an increased risk" and
recommending that some patients seek the advice of their physician).
85. The Texas booklet states: "While there are studies that have found an increased risk
of developing breast cancer after an induced abortion, some studies have found no
overall risk. There is agreement that this issue needs further study." TEX. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, supra note 57, at 17. Abortion patients must be told that they have the right
to review this booklet. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(2)(D)
(West 2011).
86. See generally GuTrMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND WAITING
PERIODS FOR ABORTION (2012) [hereinafter COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR
ABORTION], available at www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibMWPA.pdf; Gold
& Nash, supra note 55, at 6, 8-9. Minnesota's state-produced booklet, which abor-
tion patients must be offered, accurately notes that earlier studies suggested an
increased risk, but the National Cancer Institute has reported that there is no link.
MINNESOTA DEP'T OF HEALTH, IF You ARE PREGNANT: INFORMATION ON FETAL
DEVELOPMENT, ABORTION, AND ALTERNATIVEs 22 (2009), available at http://
www.health.state.mn.us/wrtk/wrtk-handbook.pdf.
87. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02.1(1)(d) (2011). The law apparently requires that
these materials be given to abortion patients. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-
02(8)(b)(2) (2011).
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studies used small sample sizes, collected data from subjects after breast
cancer had been diagnosed, and relied on self-reporting of abortions."
Better-designed studies and meta-analyses have collected data on tens of
thousands of subjects and relied on medical records rather than poten-
tially unreliable disclosures by patients about their abortion history." In
recent years, study after study has established that there is no link.o
The laws mentioned above allow providers to refrain from making
a statement to the effect that abortion increases the risk for breast cancer
because that statement is not medically accurate. However, the inclusion
of inaccurate statements in state-produced counseling materials that
providers are required to give or offer to patients is concerning, as some
patients may understand the statement to be endorsed by the health care
provider who actually gives them the materials.
B. Irrelevant or Immaterial Information
Several states require that women be given state-published counseling
materials prior to an abortion-materials that contain information that is
irrelevant or immaterial to the decisions before the abortion patient. For
example, Idaho's statute requires women be given materials that describe
and display photographs of the characteristics of the embryo or fetus at
two-week intervals from the fourth to the twenty-fourth week of gesta-
tion, as well as descriptions of "the abortion procedures used in current
88. See Nat'l Cancer Inst., Nat'l Inst. of Health, Fact Sheet: Abortion, Miscarriage, and
Breast Cancer Risk, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risklabortion-
miscarriage (last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
89. See, e.g., Valerie Beral et al., Breast Cancer and Abortion: Collaborative Reanalysis of
Data fom 53 Epidemiological Studies, Including 83,000 Women with Breast Cancer
fom 16 Countries, 363 LANCET 1007, 1007 (2004) This meta-study finds that abor-
tion does not increase risk of breast cancer. Id. Studies that ask women to report
abortions after they are diagnosed with breast cancer indicate a higher risk than stud-
ies in which women record abortions before the cancer diagnosis. Id. This suggests
the result is driven by a difference in women's likelihood of disclosure.
90. See, e.g., Katherine DeLellis Henderson et al., Incomplete Pregnancy is not Associated
with Breast Cancer Risk: The California Teachers Study, 77 CONTRACEPTION 391
(2008) (study of thousands of women finding no statistically significant association
between incomplete pregnancy, including induced abortion, and breast cancer risk);
Karin B. Michels et al., Induced and Spontaneous Abortion and Incidence of Breast
Cancer Among Young Women: A Prospective Cohort Study, 167 ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL
MED. 814 (2007); Gunnar Erlandsson et al., Abortions and Breast Cancer: Record-
Based Case-Control Study, 103 INT'L J. CANCER 676 (2003); Nat'l Cancer Inst., Nat'l
Inst. of Health, Summary Report: Early Reproductive Events and Breast Cancer,
http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/causes/ere/workshop-report (last visited Apr. 3,
2012) ("Induced abortion is not associated with an increase in breast cancer risk.").
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medical practices at the various stages of growth of the fetus and any
reasonable foreseeable complications and risks to the mother."9' Thus,
for example, a patient who at seven weeks seeks a medication abortion,
which involves no surgery, must be given information about the charac-
teristics of fetuses at much later stages of development. In addition, she
is given information about surgical abortion procedures used only at
later stages of pregnancy-information that bears no relevance to her
medical situation.
Even the portion of the materials that describes the procedure the
patient will receive does not necessarily limit itself to relevant infor-
mation. Not every detail of a surgical procedure is helpful to patients in
their decision making. No law requires that heart surgery patients be
told what will happen to their bodies in graphic detail.92 The fact that
the average person would be disgusted and disturbed by a detailed de-
scription of heart surgery does not warrant requiring such a description
as a condition of effective consent. On the contrary, most patients
would likely rather not hear the description because it would only in-
crease their anxiety about a procedure they know they must undergo.
Those patients who want a detailed description can always communi-
cate that the information is material to their consent by asking the
doctor for a description.
Similarly, even accurate pictures and descriptions of an embryo or
fetus at the same stage as the patient's pregnancy are not necessarily rele-
vant to patients' informed consent.93 Informed consent disclosures are
91. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-609(2) (2011). Including descriptions and pictures of the
stages of embryonic and fetal development and the range of abortion procedures are
common features of the counseling materials that are produced by about half the
states. See COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION, supra note 86 (listing
states); Gold & Nash, supra note 55, at 6, 8. However, most of those states do not
require that the materials be given to abortion patients; they only require that the ma-
terials be offered to patients. See, e.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.027(2), (3) (2011)
(requiring offer of materials that describe embryo or fetus in two-week increments
"from conception to full-term" along with color photographs or images and descrip-
tions of the "various" methods of abortion).
92. See Rebecca Dresser, From Double Standard to Double Bind: Informed Choice in Abor-
tion Law, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1599, 1617-18 (2008) (noting that biased
counseling laws deviate from informed consent doctrine by, inter alia, requiring
"graphic language and vivid pictures designed to discourage patients from choosing a
medical intervention").
93. The accuracy of some of the pictures is highly questionable. The representation of a
thirty-six-week-old fetus in Louisiana's booklet-which must be given to patients,
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(B)(5) (2011)-is a drawing that appears to have
the proportions of a child of two or three years, LA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HosPs.,
WOMEN'S RIGHT TO KNow 10, available at http://new.dhh.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/
Abortion-MakingaDecision.pdf. Curiously, the booklet uses the same drawing, albeit
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intended to convey medical risks and benefits. Pictures and descriptions
of embryos and fetuses are included in counseling materials because they
are assumed to have emotional or moral content.
C Statements About Fetal Pain
Recent years have seen a trend toward states including claims about
fetal pain in their biased counseling requirements." For example, in
2010, Missouri added a provision to its biased counseling law that re-
quires doctors to provide patients whose pregnancies are at twenty-two
weeks of gestational age or further with materials "that offer information
on the possibility of the abortion causing pain to the unborn child.""
There is no "when medically accurate" qualifier. The following state-
ments are required:
* "At least by twenty-two weeks of gestational age, the un-
born child possesses all the anatomical structures,
including pain receptors, spinal cord, nerve tracts, thala-
mus, and cortex, that are necessary in order to feel pain.""
* A description of the abortion procedure to be performed
and the elements that "could be painful to the unborn
child.""
* Fetuses at twenty-two weeks' gestational age and beyond
seek to evade certain stimuli in a manner that in an
rotated and reversed, to represent a fetus at forty weeks, despite using a different im-
age for the intermediate gestational age of thirty-eight weeks. Id. at 10-11.
94. Cf COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR ABoRTION, supra note 86 (listing
states). On a tangential note, the possibility of fetal pain has also become a popular
justification for total bans on abortion for certain periods prior to viability. In 2010,
Nebraska enacted the "Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act," which bans
abortions where the "probable postfertilization age" of the fetus is twenty or more
weeks. NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-3, 106 (2011). The statute's legislative findings recite:
"It is the purpose of the State of Nebraska to assert a compelling state interest in pro-
tecting the lives of unborn children from the stage at which substantial medical
evidence indicates that they are capable of feeling pain." § 28-3, 104(5). Other states
have followed suit. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 1-745.1-.11 (2011). The U.S.
Supreme Court has not recognized fetal pain as an interest justifying abortion re-
strictions and has held that bans on abortion prior to viability are unconstitutional
(twenty weeks is prior to viability). See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 846 (1992); cf Women's Med. Profi Corp. v. Voinoivich, 911 F. Supp.
1051, 1074-75 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (rejecting factual argument about fetal pain as
ground for "partial birth abortion" ban).
95. Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.027(1)(5) (2011).
96. Id. at § 188.027(1)(5)(a).
97. Id at § 188.027(1)(5)(b).
2012] 21
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
infant or an adult would be interpreted as a response to
,,n98
pain.
Anesthesia is given to fetuses at twenty-two weeks or more
during prenatal surgery, and anesthesia is given to prema-
ture babies born at twenty-two weeks or later.99 Anesthesia
is available "in order to minimize or alleviate the pain to
the unborn child."100
In 2011, Indiana enacted a statute regulating the provision of abortion
in several ways; one new requirement was that abortion providers must
inform all abortion patients, orally and in writing, "[tlhat objective sci-
entific information shows that a fetus can feel pain at or before twenty
(20) weeks of postfertilization age."o' The law requires that this state-
ment be made to all abortion patients, regardless of whether their
pregnancy has progressed to twenty weeks or not.'0 2 The Texas counsel-
ing booklet states that at the twelfth week of gestation "[t]he fibers
that carry pain to the brain are developed; however, it is unknown if
the unborn child is able to experience sensations such as pain."'
South Dakota's counseling materials state that "[f]indings from some
studies suggest that the unborn fetus may feel physical pain," without
.104
limiting the claim to a particular gestational age.
98. Id. at § 188.027(l)(5)(c).
99. Id. at § 188.027(1)(5)(d), (e).
100. Id. at § 188.027(1)(5)(f, (4). As another example, Utah amended its biased counseling
law in 2009 to require that women be offered fetal anesthesia or analgesic, in person,,
twenty-four hours before their abortion. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305(2)(a)(iv) (West
2011). Recently, Utah extended this waiting period to seventy-two hours. Act of March
20, 2012, 2012 Utah Laws H.B. 461 (West's No. 232).
101. IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(G) (2011).
102. The requirement to make a fetal-pain statement has been enjoined as applied to
Planned Parenthood of Indiana pending the outcome of that organization's challenge
to the law. Planned Parenthood of Ind. v. Comm'r of Ind. State Dep't of Health, 794
F. Supp. 2d 892, 921 (S.D. Ind. 2011). The court held that the plaintiff was likely to
succeed on its First Amendment challenge to the requirement. Because Planned
Parenthood of Indiana only performs first-trimester abortions and there is no evi-
dence that a fetus can feel pain in the first trimester, the statement in question would
be "false, misleading, and irrelevant" for its patients. 794 F. Supp. 2d at 920.
103. TEx. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 57, at 4; see also id. at 5 ("Some experts have
concluded that the unborn child is probably able to feel pain (at twenty weeks].").
The statute governing the production of this booklet does not require statements
about fetal pain to be included. See TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.014
(West 2011). Interestingly, the law directing the Department to produce this booklet
does not require that the information in it be medically or scientifically accurate, with
the exception that the required fetal descriptions must be "designed to convey only
accurate scientific information." Id. at § 171.016(c).
104. S.D. Dep't of Health, supra note 58; see also Gold & Nash, supra note 55, at 6, 12.
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These fetal pain statements are misleading; they are designed to
make patients think that it is likely that a fetus of a certain gestational
age can feel pain in circumstances when in fact the scientific evidence
does not support that proposition.' For example, biased counseling
materials that mention fetal pain frequently make the claim that fetuses
at some stage of gestation-often twenty weeks-have the necessary
physical structures to feel pain.'0 There is scientific evidence that the
neural pathways that are necessary for pain perception form as early as
the twentieth week of gestation, although other studies place this devel-
opment later, between twenty-three and thirty weeks.'0 7 But even if the
structures are in place at twenty weeks, that does not necessarily mean
that they are functioning at that time; lungs, for example, are physically
formed before they function. One review of scientific studies found that
the "arrival of sensory impulses" in the brain could not be "detected be-
fore twenty-nine weeks."' 8 Furthermore, there is data suggesting that
fetuses are in a constant sleep-like state and unable to experience pain,
and that biochemicals in the in utero environment may sedate and anes-
thetize the fetus.o10
Similarly, many experts believe that fetal reactions to tactile stimuli
are reflexes that do not indicate a sensation of pain."' Such reflexes are
exhibited in humans who have no forebrain due to anencephaly or
whose cortex is not functioning."12 Since most experts believe the cortex
105. See Harper Jean Tobin, Confronting Misinformation on Abortion: Informed Consent,
Deference, andFetalPain Laws, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 111, 143-48 (2008).
106. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1105(a)(1)(A) (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-9A-
4(a)(3) (2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.10(A) (2011); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1299.35.6(C)(1)(a)(ii) (2011).
107. Tobin, supra note 105, at 143-44.
108. Michelle C. White & Andrew R. Wolf, Pain and Stress in the Human Fetus, 18 BEST
PRACTICE & RES. CLINICAL ANESTHESIOLOGY 205, 207 (2004); see also ROYAL COLL.
or OBSTETRICIANS & GYNAECOLOGISTS, FETAL AWARENESS: REVIEW OF RESEARCH
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICE viii (2010) [hereinafter FETAL AWARENESS]
(concluding that neural connections to the cortex necessary for pain perception are
not present before twenty-four weeks) .
109. FETAL AWARENESS, supra note 108, at 23; Tobin, supra note 105, at 144-45.
110. See Annie Murphy Paul, The FirstAche, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Feb. 10, 2008, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/10/magazine/1OFetal-t.html?pagewanted=all
(quoting David Mellor, founding director of the Animal Welfare Science and Bioeth-
ics Center at Massey University in New Zealand). This Article also quotes experts
who believe that fetuses can feel pain by twenty weeks or even earlier.
111. Cf, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. 5 20-16-1105(a)(1)(A) (2011) (requiring counseling mate-
rials to state, "There is evidence that by twenty (20) weeks gestation unborn children
seek to evade certain stimuli in a manner that in an infant or an adult would be in-
terpreted to be a response to pain.").
112. See FETAL AWARENESS, supra note 108, at 9; Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A System-
atic Multidisciplinary Review ofthe Evidence, 294 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 947, 950 (2005).
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is necessary for awareness of pain,"' the presence of reflexes in individu-
als without functioning cortexes is evidence that those reflexes are not
necessarily indicative of the sensation of pain." 4 In addition, the state-
ment that fetal anesthesia is routine during fetal surgery"' is misleading.
Fetal anesthesia and analgesia serve purposes other than pain reduction,
such as inhibiting fetal movement and preventing hormonal stress re-
sponses. Their use in surgery is not evidence that surgeons believe that
fetuses feel pain,"' although any reader not familiar with the science
behind the practice of fetal surgery would take the statements in the
counseling materials as evidence that doctors believe fetuses feel pain."'
While there is a controversy among experts regarding fetal pain past
twenty weeks,'18 the statements made in some states' counseling materi-
als do not notify patients of the controversy. They either articulate only
one side of the controversy or selectively refer to certain facts without
adequately explaining their implications for the possibility of fetal pain.
South Dakota's complete lack of qualification of the statement that "the
unborn fetus may feel physical pain""' makes. it misleading to the point
of falsehood, since it is uncontroversial that embryos and fetuses early in
gestation cannot feel pain. 20 The Texas booklet's claim that it is "un-
known" whether fetuses can feel pain at twelve weeks 21 is equally
misleading, since there is not even scientific debate about fetal pain that
early. Furthermore, while some statutes require that women be notified
of the option of fetal anesthesia, they do not require disclosure of the
risk that fetal anesthesia carries for the pregnant woman.122 Yet again, the
113. See FETAL AWARENESS, supra note 108, at viii.
114. See Tobin, supra note 105, at 145-46.
115. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.6(D)(3)(a)(ii) (2011) (requiring counsel-
ing materials to state: "Anesthesia is routinely administered to unborn children who
are twenty weeks gestational age or older who undergo prenatal surgery.").
116. See Paul, supra note 110 (quoting anesthesiologist Mark Rosen concerning the pur-
poses of fetal anesthesia).
117. See Tobin, supra note 105, at 148. Some experts do believe that fetal anesthesia re-
lieves fetal pain. See Paul, supra note 110 (quoting anesthesiologist Ray Paschall).
118. Cf Teresa Stanton Collett, Fetal Pain Legislation: Is It Viable?, 30 PEPP. L. REv. 161,
163-68 (2003) (citing expert statements that support the existence of fetal pain even
before twenty weeks' gestation).
119. S.D. Dep't of Health, supra note 58; see also Gold & Nash, supra note 55, at 6, 12.
120. FETAL AwARENESS, supra note 108, at 5 ("The presence of nociceptors is necessary for
perception of acute surgical pain and so pain is clearly not possible before the noci-
ceptors first appear at 10 weeks.").
121. TEx. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 57, at 4.
122. See Stuart W.G. Derbyshire, Fetal Pain: Do We Know Enough to Do the Right Thing?,
16 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 117, 124 (2008) (stating that fetal pain relief prior to
abortion is not supported by evidence and increases risk to the patient as well as cost);
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bias in favor of childbirth in these laws is clear; there is no real effort to
give patients all of the information that might inform their choice. Leg-
islators bend over backward to include anything that might discourage a
woman from choosing abortion but omit corresponding risks on the
other side of the scale.
D. Ideological or Moral Statements
Since 2005, South Dakota's biased counseling statute has required
that the physicians tell their abortion patients "[t]hat the abortion will
terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human being.", 23
In 2009, North Dakota added an identical mandatory disclosure.124
Some biased counseling laws convey ideological speech in slightly
more subtle ways. Biased counseling materials frequently use anti-
abortion language, especially by referring to the pregnancy as an "unborn
child." 25 Some state-produced materials direct patients to crisis pregnancy
centers that are devoted to persuading women not to have abortions.126
South Dakota went much further in 2011 when it enacted a law that
requires abortion patients to be subjected to private ideological speech.
Paul, supra note 110 (naming infection and uncontrolled bleeding as risks of fetal an-
esthesia during abortion).
123. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2011). See also Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 188.027(l)(2) (2011).
124. N.D. CENT. CODE% § 14-02.1-02(8)(a)(2), -03(1) (2011). This biased counseling re-
quirement is subject to a medical emergency exception, as are most. However, in 2011
the North Dakota legislature expressly excluded the risk that the woman commit suicide
from definition of "medical emergency," N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-02(9) (2011),
expressing its callous judgment that there are circumstances in which it is acceptable for
a woman to die because of restrictions on the provision of abortion. North Carolina's
2011 biased counseling statute includes a similar exception to the definition of "medi-
cal emergency." H.B. 854, Sess. Law 2011-405 sec. 1 (N.C. 2011) (to be codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. 90-21.81(5)). It might be argued that the legislative purpose of this
exception is to prevent women from escaping the counseling requirement by dishon-
estly claiming to intend suicide. But even if that is true, the legislation as written
prevents health care professionals from doing what they believe is necessary to pre-
serve the life of a woman who is actually at risk of killing herself.
125. For example, the counseling materials in Kansas, which the statute requires be given
to abortion patients, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709(d) (2011), consistently use the term
"unborn child." KAN. DEP'T OF HEALTH & ENVR., IF YOU ARE PREGNANT (2009),
available at http://www.kansaswomansrighttoknow.org/download/Handbook
.English.pdf. The term appears on virtually every page, while the word "fetus" does
not appear at all.
126. See, e.g., TEx. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 57, at 3; OKLA. DEP'T OF HEALTH, A
WOMAN's RIGHT To KNow: RESOURCE DIRECTORY 8, available at http://
www.awomansright.org/pdflResourceDirectory.pdf.
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The statute provides that, before they consent to an abortion, patients
must "have a consultation at a pregnancy help center,"127 which the law
defines, inter alia, as an organization dedicated to helping "a pregnant
mother maintain her relationship with her unborn child and care for her
unborn child."' 28 Thus, the state requires that patients be subjected to
private speech that will make claims about the moral status of the em-
bryo or fetus in order to discourage them from carrying out their
decision to terminate their pregnancies.
These laws mandate that physicians make ideological statements
they may not agree with and that are not part of their duty to disclose
medically relevant information.129 They are meant to convey the meta-
physical proposition that the embryo or fetus is a person or the
normative proposition that it is an entity with a particular moral status.
Even taking it as a given that the state has the power to engage in such
speech, it should not intrude into the doctor-patient relationship to do
so.
These laws are sometimes defended as not being ideological at all.
For example, South Dakota's "unique human being" statement was up-
held in the face of a challenge that it violated doctors' First Amendment
rights not to be compelled to utter the state's ideological speech.o In
order to avoid the seemingly obvious conclusion that the statement was
ideological, the court looked to the statutory definition of "human be-
ing" and concluded that the statement was meant in a biological sense,
as referring to a "member of the species of Homo sapiens.""' However,
the average person would not understand the words "separate, unique,
living human being" to have a purely biological meaning unless the stat-
127. H.B. 1217, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. (S.D. 2012). This law is subject to a preliminary
injunction during the pendency of a constitutional challenge. Planned Parenthood of
Minn. v. Daugaard, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1077 (D.S.D. 2011). In finding the
plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that this law constitutes an undue bur-
den on the right to abortion, the court said that the requirement that an abortion
patient visit a crisis pregnancy center "humiliates and degrades her as a human be-
ing." Id. at 1060.
128. H.B. 1217, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. (S.D. 2012).
129. Cf Doe v. Planned Parenthood/Chi. Area, 956 N.E. 2d 564, 573 (Ill. App. Ct.
2011) ("No court, regardless of where it sits, has found a common law duty requiring
doctors to tell their pregnant patients that aborting an embryo, or fetus, is the killing
of an existing human being."); Acuna v. Turkish, 930 A.2d 416, 418, 427-28 (N.J.
2007) (rejecting claim that the tort doctrine of informed consent requires physicians
to inform abortion patients that abortion kills a "complete, separate, unique and irre-
placeable human being" on the ground that such a statement is not material medical
information).
130. Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 737-38 (8th Cit. 2008)
(vacating preliminary injunction).
131. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735-37.
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utory definition were also read to her. Even then, the words "separate"
and "unique" seem clearly intended to convey moral or metaphysical
meaning-not least because, on a biological understanding of the word,
an embryo or fetus is not obviously "separate" from the pregnant
woman since it is inside her body and connected to her via the umbili-
cal cord and placenta.
Furthermore, the argument that these statements convey only the
biological fact that the embryo or fetus is a member of the species
Homo sapiens makes the statements utterly pointless.13 2 There is no
competent person who thinks that a woman's embryo or fetus might be
a member of some other species,'33 and no one who knows what preg-
nancy is fails to know that, in the usual course, a pregnancy results in
the birth of a human being. Those who would defend the statements in
question as non-ideological cannot provide a sensible reason why such a
trivial fact ought to be disclosed to abortion patients.
Generally, informed consent laws do not require health care pro-
fessionals to make moral or philosophical statements. For example,
end-of-life decisions implicate profound moral questions about the
termination of human life, but doctors are not required to lecture pa-
tients about the moral considerations, much less to present the state's
moral views as medical fact.' Imagine a legislature dominated by
Jehovah's Witnesses requiring doctors to tell patients who need blood
transfusions that the procedure is prohibited by God.' Objections to
such a law would be fierce, because even a religious majority should
not intrude into the doctor-patient relationship and use doctors to
present the majority's moral views to patients. Whether the proposi-
tion is philosophically or morally correct is not the issue; making such
statements is not part of the physician's duty to convey the medical
considerations relevant to a patient deciding whether to consent to a
medical intervention. 36
Patients are capable of seeking guidance regarding the moral dimen-
sions of their decisions from the appropriate people, such as family
members, clergy, or even health care professionals who provide abortions,
132. See Post, supra note 3, at 954-55 (arguing that South Dakota's "human being"
statement is either trivially true or states a controversial moral proposition).
133. See id. at 954.
134. See Dresser, supra note 92, at 1619 (noting that informed consent to the removal of
life-sustaining treatment does not require the disclosure of moral judgments).
135. Cf, e.g., Campbell v. Delbridge, 670 N.W.2d 108, 109 (Iowa 2003) (discussing
religious belief of Jehovah's Witness that precludes the use of blood transfusions).
136. Cf Post, supra note 3, at 958-60 (arguing that disclosures required by South Dako-
ta's biased counseling statute concern ideological and moral propositions rather than
medical facts).
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if they so desire. Women do not need a mandatory disclosure to inform
them of the fact that the abortion decision is a morally weighty one.
Women have an interest in choosing where to get their moral guidance
from as opposed to having the state's view thrust upon them with their
physician as the mouthpiece.
E. Descriptions of Ultrasounds
Several states require that women undergo ultrasounds, sometimes
called "sonograms," before obtaining abortions.' In the context of
abortion care, ultrasounds are primarily used to confirm that the preg-
nancy is in the uterus (as opposed to being ectopic) and the gestational
age of the pregnancy. Ultrasounds intended to view a pregnancy may be
performed vaginally, by inserting a wand-shaped transducer into the
vagina, or abdominally, by moving a broad transducer over the abdo-
men. Early in a pregnancy, a vaginal ultrasound provides a better view of
the uterus and its contents.' The majority of abortion providers rou-
tinely perform ultrasounds on their patients.'39
Some states go further than requiring a pre-abortion ultrasound be
performed. North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Texas have enacted statutes
that require women to have their ultrasound described to them, even if
they do not want to hear such a description. The Oklahoma statute,
which has been struck down, provided that, " [i]n order for the woman
137. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-23A-4(b)(4), 26-23A-6(b) (2011) (requiring the physician
who will perform the abortion or the referring physician to "perform an ultrasound
on the unborn child" and give the woman an opportunity to view the ultrasound);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.35.2(D), .6(B) (2011) (providing that consent to an
abortion "is voluntary and informed only if an obstetric ultrasound is performed" at
least two hours prior to the abortion); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-34 (2011) (requir-
ing a pre-abortion ultrasound be performed and the patient be offered the chance to
see it).
138. See Harm-Gerd K. Blaas & Jos6 M. Carrera, Investigation of Early Pregnancy, in UL-
TRASOUND IN OBSTETRICS AND GYNAECOLOGY 57, 58 (Juriy Wladimiroff & Sturla
Eik-Nes, eds., 2009).
139. See Katharine O'Connell et al., First-Trimester Surgical Abortion Practices: A Survey of
National Abortion Federation Members, 79 CONTRACEPTION 385, 388 (2009). Alt-
hough the routine use of ultrasounds in abortion care shows that they are useful, they
are not medically necessary. See Bliss Kaneshiro et. al, Expanding Medical Abortion:
Can Medical Abortion Be Effectively Provided Without the Routine Use of Ultrasound?,
83 CONTRACEPTION 194 (2011) (concluding that physical examination and pa-
tients' reports of last menstrual period can be used to estimate gestational age and
that non-ultrasound methods can effectively confirm complete pregnancy expul-
sion after medical abortion).
140. OIKLA. STAT. tit. 63, %§ 1-738.1A, 1-738.3d, & 1-738.3e (West 2011). This law has
been found to violate the state constitution's special law provisions. See Nova Health
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to make an informed decision,"'4 an ultrasound must be performed at
least one hour before the abortion, "using either a vaginal transducer or
an abdominal transducer, whichever would display the embryo or fetus
more clearly." 4 2 It required the physician or technician to place the ul-
trasound in the woman's line of sight"' and to describe the image,
including "the dimensions of the embryo or fetus, the presence of cardi-
ac activity, if present and viewable, and the presence of external
members and internal organs, if present and viewable."'"
Oklahoma state Senator Todd Lamb introduced a substantially
identical, prior version of this law in the state senate."' Lamb has
acknowledged that "the purpose of the ultrasound requirement was to
reduce the number of abortions."' He also stated that ultrasounds al-
low doctors to "disclose fully the information regarding the woman's
pregnancy" and that requiring a woman to have an ultrasound would
benefit her mental health, apparently by protecting her from "later re-
gretting the taking of a human life."'
Senator Lamb's comments fit with the way anti-abortion activists
seem to view ultrasound requirements: they think that an ultrasound
contributes to informed consent by conveying the moral status of the
embryo or fetus to the woman, who will then decide to carry the preg-
nancy to term. Two assumptions of this line of thought should be
Systems v. Pruitt, No. 2:12-CV-00395., 2012 WL 1034022 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Okla.
Cnty. Mar. 28, 2012) (enjoining statute's enforcement permanently). The statute de-
serves discussion here despite being enjoined for a number of reasons. First, the
legislative history of the law provides an illustrative example of the use of informed
consent as a justification for limiting access to abortion. Second, this statute was
passed after the Oklahoma Supreme Court struck down a substantially identical stat-
ute, see Nova Health Sys. v. Edmonson, 233 P.3d 380 (Okla. 2010), so the
legislature may simply pass another version in the future. And finally, the district
court's decision will almost certainly be appealed, so the statute discussed here may
eventually be enforced, depending on the decision of the state's high court.
141. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B) (2011).
142. Id. at § 1-738.3d(B)(1).
143. Id. at § 1-738.3d(B)(3). The woman is allowed to "avert her eyes." Id. at § 1-
738.3d(C).
144. Id. at § 1-738.3d(B)(4).
145. Okla. Sen. 1878 History, 51st Leg., 2d Sess. § 12 (2008). This bill passed over the
governor's veto but was invalidated because it violated the Oklahoma Constitution's
rule that the legislation must have only a single subject. Nova Health Sys. v. Edmon-
son, 233 P.3d 380 (Okla. 2010).
146. Weber, supra note 2, at 365 (paraphrasing Lamb's statements from a 2008 interview).
147. Id.; see also id. at 369 ("[Lamb] described the mental torment that some women go
through after aborting their child.").
148. See Kevin Sack, In Ultrasound, Abortion Fight Has New Front, N.Y. TIMES, May 27,
2010, at Al (quoting Focus of the Family spokesperson as saying, in support of
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made explicit. First, anti-abortion activists apparently think that some
women fail to understand that abortion is wrong but if that message is
conveyed to them, they will not terminate their pregnancies. This disre-
spects the effort that women put into decisions about their pregnancies
without the help of the state. There is also evidence that this assumption
is false, since states with ultrasound requirements do not see a significant
reduction in the number of abortions."' Second, anti-abortion activists
seem to believe that it is acceptable to characterize a protocol as "in-
formed consent" when their primary reason for favoring it is that it will
encourage patients to make the decision the activists approve of-that
is, carry the pregnancy to term-rather than ensuring that patients exer-
.. 150
cise their own autonomy. .
Oklahoma's statute required a vaginal ultrasound in some cases, be-
cause there will be circumstances in which a vaginal ultrasound provides
a clearer image 5' than an abdominal one. Thus, the law required women
to submit to vaginal penetration without. consent. This is a violation of
bodily integrityl52 and brings up disturbing connotations of rape. .
In 2011, Texas followed Oklahoma and amended its biased coun-
seling statute to require that an ultrasound be performed at least
twenty-four hours before any abortion.'5 ' The provider is also required
to "display[] the sonogram images ... in a manner that the pregnant
mandatory ultrasound law: "To be able to put a face on that baby humanizes this
process and really allows the mother to connect.").
149. Id. (noting that Alabama's forced ultrasound law "had no apparent impact on the
number of abortions").
150. Cf Emily Ramshaw, Required Delay Between Sonogram and Abortion Creates Logistical
Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/us/required-
delay-between-sonogram-and-abortion-creates-logistical-issues-in-texas.html (quoting
supporter of ultrasound law claiming that seeing an ultrasound image will change
woman's mind regarding abortion).
151. The statute required either an abdominal or vaginal ultrasound, "whichever would
display the embryo or fetus more clearly." OIKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.3d(B)(1)
(West 2011). Early in pregnancy, vaginal ultrasounds tend to provide clearer images.
See Weber, supra note 2, at 379. Most abortions in the United States occur during
the first trimester. See FACTS ON INDUCED ABORTION IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 37.
152. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) ("Th[e]
notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in the requirement that informed con-
sent is generally required for medical treatment."); Weber, supra note 2, at 375-81
(arguing that a prior version of Oklahoma's forced ultrasound law violated individu-
als' Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse medical treatment); cf Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725 (1997) (noting "the common-law rule that forced
medication was a battery ... and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to
refuse unwanted medical treatment").
153. H.R. 15, 82d Leg,. 1st Special Sess. (Tex. 2011). The ultrasound requirement is to be
codified at TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012(a)(4).
[VOL.19:130
ABORTION AND INFORMED CONSENT
woman may view them," explain the ultrasound image, make the em-
bryonic or fetal heartbeat audible (a process called "auscultation"), and
provide a verbal explanation of the sound.5 4 The North Carolina legis-
lature enacted a similar law over Governor Beverly Perdue's veto in
201 .'" The laws in all three of these states apparently require that
patients listen to a description of the ultrasound or the heartbeat even if
they do not want to. This takes the choice of what information the pa-
tient will receive away from physician and patient.
E Waiting Periods
States with biased counseling laws typically impose mandatory waiting
periods.'5 6 For example, Arizona passed a biased counseling law in 2009
that requires counseling disclosures be made "orally and in person" at
least twenty-four hours prior to the abortion." In 2011, South Dakota
enacted a law that mandates that physicians meet with patients in per-
son to provide the required biased counseling and then wait seventy-two
hours before performing an abortion.' The legislator who drafted the
South Dakota law claimed that it serves the purpose of informed con-
sent, saying, "There's greater assurance that a woman considering an
abortion is going to be fully informed about all the risks and about all
154. Id. (to be codified at TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 171.012 (a)(4)(B), (C);
§ 171.022(b), (c), (d)). These requirements have been upheld against a constitutional
challenge. Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, No. A-11 -CA-
486, 2012 WL 373132, at -5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012) (expressing district court's
disagreement with Fifth Circuit decision finding no constitutional infirmities in
statute, but noting that district court was compelled to defer).
155. N.C. H.B. 854, Sess. Law 2011-405 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.80-
.92); see also Lynn Bonner, Override Vote Enacts Abortion Law, THE CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, July 29, 2011, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2011/07/29/2488568/
senate-overrides-veto-on-abortion.html. These requirements, like those of Oklahoma,
are not being enforced as of this writing because of a preliminary injunction. Stuart v.
Huff, No. 1:11CV804, 2011 WL 6330668 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 19, 2011).
156. COUNSELING AND WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION, supra note 86.
157. Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2153(A)(1), (2) (2011). Ultrasound laws also often im-
pose waiting periods of their own. In 2010, Louisiana passed a mandatory ultrasound
law that requires a two-hour wait between the ultrasound and the abortion. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. %§ 40:1299.35.2(D)(2) (2011).
158. H.B. 1217, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. (S.D. 2012). As of this writing, the statute is enjoined
pending a constitutional challenge. Planned Parenthood of Minn. v. Daugaard, 799 F.
Supp. 2d 1048, 1066 (D.S.D. 2011) (holding that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on
their "undue burden" claim because of logistical obstacles created by waiting period, in-
cluding financial burden and danger to abused women); Joey Ferguson, South Dakota
Federal Judge Blocks Abortion Law in Wake ofKansas Controversy, DESERET NEWS, July
1, 2011, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700148624/ South-Dakota-federal-
judge-blocks-abortion-law-in-wake-of-Kansas-controversy.html.
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the options."'" The legislative findings mention ensuring that the pa-
tient's decision is "truly voluntary, uncoerced, and informed,"' but
they also make clear that the statute's purpose is to discourage abor-
tions. In 2012, Utah also enacted a seventy-two hour waiting period,
which is being enforced as of this writing.6 2 When Governor Gary
Herbert signed the bill, his spokesperson said, "The governor is an ada-
mant supporter of rights for the unborn and felt the bill appropriately
allows a woman facing such a decision time to fully weigh her options,
as well as the implications of the decision." 63
It is deeply patronizing to require that women wait for a set
amount of time before carrying out their decisions. For legislators to
believe that such laws are needed, they must think that women are im-
pulsive, thoughtless creatures who need to be forced to sleep on it when
,they attempt make an important decision. There is no reason to think
that abortion patients have not already carefully thought about the deci-
sion to terminate their pregnancies before they visit an abortion
provider.
Waiting periods pose significant practical obstacles to abortion ac-
cess for many women.'6 When they are combined with a requirement
that counseling be given in person or that an ultrasound be performed,
waiting periods require women to make two trips to the abortion pro-
vider. This can present a serious hardship to women who need to travel a
long distance to the abortion provider, who have difficulty taking time
off from work or securing child care, or who seek confidentiality regard-
ing their abortion. Waiting periods offer no benefit to balance these
harms, since women have the capacity to make decisions about the
159. A.G. Sulzberger, Women Seeking Abortions in South Dakota to Get Anti-Abortion Ad-
vice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2011, at A16 (quoting Roger Hunt).
160. H.B. 1217, 2012 Leg., 87th Sess. (S.D. 2012).
161. See id. at § 1(5) ("It is a necessary and proper exercise of the state's authority to give
precedence to the mother's fundamental interest in her relationship with her child
over the irrevocable method of termination of that relationship by induced abor-
tion.").
162. Act of March 20, 2012, Utah Laws H.B. 461 (West's No. 232).
163. Robert Gehrke, Guy Signs Bill Requiring 72-Hour Wait for Abortions, SALT LAKE
TRus., Mar. 20, 2012, http://www.sitrib.com/sltrib/politics/53758
6 18-90/period-
waiting-utah-women.html. csp
164. Cf Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 23-24 (Tenn.
2000) (striking down two-day waiting period under state constitution, in part be-
cause of the burdens it would impose on women in terms of mortality, health,
emotional well-being, and finances).
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course of their reproductive lives and the exercise of their fundamental
rights without being sent home to think about it.
III. ETHICAL ACCOUNTS OF INFORMED CONSENT
Part III is a survey of some of the most influential and well-
developed accounts of informed consent in medical ethics. None of these
accounts provides an ethical justification for the features of biased
counseling laws discussed above. This Part analyzes a number of different
approaches to informed consent. I chose these views to focus on either
because they are highly influential in the field of medical ethics or because
they are well-developed accounts that exhibit significant philosophical
differences from the highly influential accounts, providing a diversity of
approaches to examine. For present purposes, I am agnostic as to which, if
any, of these accounts of informed consent is correct. My purpose is to
survey well-developed views of the concept in the field of medical ethics
and to argue that biased counseling laws fail to serve the purposes of the
ethical concept on any of these different views.' 66
A. Consent as Autonomous Authorization
Perhaps the most influential account of informed consent in the
field of medical ethics is the theory presented by Ruth Faden and Tom
Beauchamp in A History and Theory of Informed Consent. 67 Faden and
165. Cf Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d at 23 (quoting with approval trial court's statement that
mandatory waiting period "insults the intelligence and decision-making capabilities
of a woman").
166. I am not claiming that the authors discussed here have expressed disapproval of bi-
ased counseling laws or that they have any particular position on the morality of
abortion itself. I claim only that conclusions about the morality of certain characteris-
tics of biased counseling laws follow from these authors' views on informed consent.
167. FADEN & BEAucHAMP, supra note 5. Scholars discussing informed consent frequently
note the importance of this work. See, e.g., Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer,
Preface to a Theory of Consent Transactions: Beyond Valid Consent, in THE ETHICS OF
CONSENT (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 2009) (describing Faden and
Beauchamp as having "best developed" the "prevailing theory" of informed consent);
Steven Joffe & Robert D. Truog, Consent to Medical Care: The Importance of Fiduciary
Context, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT, supra, at 347-49 (describing Faden and Beau-
champ as offering the "standard conception" of informed consent); Jeffrey Kahn,
Informed Consent in Human Gene Transfer Clinical Tials, 19 HuMAN GENE THERAPY
7, 7 (2008) (referring to Faden and Beauchamp's "now standard analysis of what consti-
tutes adequate informed consent"); NEIL C. MANSON & ONORA O'NEILL, RETHINKING
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Beauchamp offer a conceptual analysis of informed consent, explaining
the logical and philosophical contours of the concept. Informed consent,
in the sense I am concerned with, is an autonomous authorization by the
patient for a medical professional6 8 to undertake an intervention. 6 ' Faden
and Beauchamp develop their account of moral philosophy from a
framework in which principles are fundamental. Rights, duties, and ob-
ligations-as well as professional codes and legal regulations-are
derived from or evaluated with reference to principles.o Three princi-
ples are relevant to informed consent: respect for autonomy,
beneficence, and justice. Although these principles are of equal prima
facie weight and none necessarily trumps the others as a general matter,
when it comes to informed consent, respect for autonomy "is the single
most important moral value.""' This "three principles" approach, 2 also
called "pluralistic principlism," 7 1 is the dominant philosophical frame-
work in the medical ethics field. 7 1
The principle of respect for autonomy requires that individuals be
"free to choose and act without controlling constraints imposed by oth-
INFORMED CONSENT IN BioETHIcs 18 n.17 (2007) (listing Faden and Beauchamp's
book as one of the "most cited works on autonomy and informed consent").
168. For some purposes, ethicists make a distinction between physicians and other health
care professionals. There is no reason to maintain such a distinction for the purposes
of this Article. Throughout my descriptions of ethical accounts in this Part, I largely
follow authors' usage; nothing hinges on the term used to pick out medical profes-
sionals, even where "physician" is used.
169. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 293. Faden and Beauchamp's account covers
consent to participate in research as well as medical interventions. Because I am
concerned only with the clinical context, I have left consent to research out of my
discussion of their theory.
170. Id. at 4-6.
171. Id.; see also Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT,
supra note 167, at 55, 61 ("[T]he protection of autonomous choice is fundamental to
the justification of rules of informed consent."). Other ethics scholars have ques-
tioned the notion that respect for autonomy is the value underlying informed consent
requirements; I discuss some prominent examples below.
172. It is sometimes referred to as a "four principles" approach, depending on whether
nonmaleficence, the avoidance of doing harm, is considered a principle distinct from
beneficence or subsumed under it. See, e.g., Tom L. Beauchamp, The 'Four Principles'
Approach to Health Care Ethics, in PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE ETHICS 3, 4-6
(Richard E. Ashcroft et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
173. See James F. Childress, Methods in Bioethics, in THE OxFoRD HANDBOOK OF BIOETH-
ics 15, 21-22 (Bonnie Steinbock ed., 2007). Faden and Beauchamp's approach is
"pluralistic" in that it does not consider a single one of the principles to have prima-
cy.
174. Cf, e.g, ALFRED 1. TAUBER, PATIENT AUTONOMY AND THE ETHICS OF RESPONSIBIL-
iTY 25 (2005) ("[P]rinciplism has become the preferred theoretical structure of
medical ethics . . . ."); Childress, supra note 173, at 17 (addressing the claim that
principle-based methods are the dominant type of method in bioethics).
34 [Vol. 19:1
ABORTION AND INFORMED CONSENT
ers."'" It is the recognition of this principle that has led to the ac-
ceptance of a requirement for informed consent in clinical medicine.16
Beneficence, the promotion of the welfare of others, is clearly fun-
damental to the practice of medicine, which is at heart the attempt to
make patients better.'" In the informed consent context, the principle of
beneficence can easily come into conflict with the principle of autono-
my: a physician may want to undertake a medical intervention because
it is what is best for the patient, regardless of whether the patient con-
sents to the intervention or whether the patient has the information
necessary to make her own decision. This is the problem of paternalism,
and the question of how to balance the competing values of pursuing
patient welfare and protecting patient autonomy pervades discussions of
. 178informed consent.
The third principle, justice, requires that individuals be "treated ac-
cording to what is fair, due, or owed.""' This principle has implications
regarding the allocation of scarce medical resources, although Faden and
Beauchamp also note that it is unjust to impose an "undue burden" on
the ability to exercise a right, for example, by making "a piece of infor-
mation owed to a person unreasonably difficult to obtain."'
Since their account of informed consent emphasizes the principle of
respect for autonomy, Faden and Beauchamp offer a conceptual analysis
of autonomous action. An action is autonomous only if it satisfies three
conditions: intentionality, understanding, and noncontrol.'"' Because the
latter two conditions admit of degrees rather than being all-or-nothing,
actions may be more or less autonomous on this account.
An action is intentional if it is "willed in accordance with a plan."'82
The second condition, understanding, is a matter of degree in that
individuals can have more or less understanding. An individual acts with
175. FADEN & BEAucHAMp, supra note 5, at 8.
176. See FADEN & BEAucHAMP, supra note 5, at 101; see also BEAucHAMP & CHILDRESS,
supra note 9, at 118 ("[S]ince the mid-1970s the primary justification advanced for
requirements of informed consent has been to protect autonomous choice.
177. FADEN & BEAucHAMP, supra note 5, at 9-10.
178. See id. at 13; cf BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 206-16 (discussing con-
flicts between beneficence and respect for autonomy, including the problem of
paternalism, in the context of a principle-based account of medical ethics).
179. FADEN & BEAucHAMP, supra note 5, at 14.
180. Id. at 14-15.
181. Id. at 238. Faden and Beauchamp entertain the possibility that another condition,
authenticity, may be necessary. Id. at 262-68. While the condition of noncontrol is
focused on control by other people, authenticity would require autonomous actions
not to be brought about by internal forces like addiction or neurotic compulsion. Id.
at 264.
182. Id. at 243.
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complete understanding if she has an adequate apprehension of all the
relevant descriptions of both the nature of the action and the foreseeable
consequences of taking and not taking the action.183 The substantial
understanding necessary for informed consent requires that the patient
understand all the material or important propositions that add to her
comprehension of her situation."' False beliefs are detrimental to
understanding. When an individual takes an action while believing a
false proposition relevant to that action, the action is less than fully
autonomous.'8 Whether a proposition is material is determined by
whether it subjectively matters to the patient's evaluation of her
options.' Third, the condition of noncontrol means that actions are less
than fully autonomous to the extent that they are controlled by external
factors, especially other people.' 87 For Faden and Beauchamp, some
external influences do not prevent actions from being autonomous:
those that the individual can resist,' those that do not cause the
individual to fail the condition of substantial understanding,8 8 and
those that appeal to reason that the individual freely accepts.190
1. Informed Consent
Faden and Beauchamp define informed consent as a patient's au-
tonomous action authorizing a health care professional to do something.
Using the analysis of autonomous action discussed above, a patient gives
informed consent if she "with (1) substantial understanding and (2) in
substantial absence of control by others (3) intentionally (4) authorizes a
professional" to undertake a medical intervention. 9' A person who satis-
183. Id. at 252.
184. Id. at 302.
185. Id. at 253.
186. Id. at 302. There will be relevant propositions about a medical intervention, such as
the exact number of sutures used in a surgery, that will not be material to the patient,
because she does not consider it important that there are twenty as oposed to nine-
teen sutures. See id. at 304.
187. Id. at 256.
188. Id. at 261-62, 339.
189. Id. at 362.
190. Id. at 260-62, 347-48.
191. Id. at 278. The authors distinguish two senses of informed consent. In addition to
the first sense, defined in the quoted passage, they discuss a sense of informed consent
that concerns whether an authorization is effective in that it satisfies the relevant pro-
cedural rules in some institutional context. See id. at 280-87. To put it crudely, this
second sense asks, "Did the patient sign the right form?" In examining whether bi-
ased counseling laws fit with Faden and Beauchamp's account of informed consent in
the first sense, I am following the authors' conviction that the first sense, autonomous
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fies the first three conditions but refuses the intervention gives an in-
formed refusal.192
Faden and Beauchamp reject the notion that professionals should
attempt to instill the substantial understanding necessary for informed
consent through a standard set of disclosures.9 3 Rather than check off a
list of disclosures, professionals should focus on effective communication,
which requires an informational exchange: physicians must ask questions
to learn what is important to patients and must elicit questions from the
patients themselves.' However, a core disclosure is still necessary to
initiate the communication process, and it should be guided by three
considerations: (1) propositions that patients usually think are material
regarding the proposed intervention; (2) what the professional thinks is
material, including a recommendation regarding treatment; and (3) an
explanation about the purpose of seeking consent and the nature of the
authorization."' These disclosures lead to a dialogue intended to bring
about a shared understanding between patient and professional.
This account does not require that patient and professional believe
all the same propositions; it is enough that they each understand the
material propositions the other believes without necessarily accepting
authorization, ought to be the basis of a moral evaluation of the second sense, proce-
durally effective consent. Id. at 284; Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in
THE ETHICS OF CONSENT, supra note 167, at 55, 58 ("1 take it as axiomatic that the
model of autonomous choice ... ought to serve as the benchmark for the moral ade-
quacy of institutional rules.").
192. These conditions overlap significantly with common textbook sketches of informed
consent. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 120-21 (providing sev-
en-factor definition consisting of competence, voluntariness, disclosure,
recommendation, understanding, decision, and authorization); BERNARD GERT,
CHARLES M. CULVER & K. DANNER CLOUSER, BIOETHICs: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH
213 (2d ed. 2006) ("It is widely accepted in bioethics and in health law that three cri-
teria must be satisfied in order for a patient's consent to be valid: the patient must be
given adequate information about the decision she is being asked to make; the patient
must be fully competent to consent to or refuse the diagnostic or therapeutic inter-
vention that is being suggested; and coercion must not be employed in obtaining her
decision."); Robert Young, Informed Consent and Patient Autonomy, in A COMPANION
To BIOETHICs 441, 442 (Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer eds., 1998) ("For a patient to
be capable of giving informed consent she must be competent, must understand the
information disclosed to her and must give (or withold) her consent freely.").
193. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 305-07 (rejecting the professional practice
standard and reasonable patient standard, each of which determines the disclosures
required by tort law in some jurisdictions). The authors deny that they are proposing
"legal reforms or generally applicable policies" but nevertheless argue that their strate-
gies for encouraging patient understanding "can and should be broadly
implemented." Id. at 298.
194. See id. at 307.
195. Id. at 307-08; cf BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 121.
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them as true, as long as the beliefs in question are "inherently contesta-
ble.""' If, on the other hand, a patient has an unjustifiable false belief
about a material proposition, then a shared understanding has not been
achieved and informed consent is not possible.'9 For example, a patient's
refusal to consent to cancer treatment because of an unjustifiable belief
that she could not have cancer because she did not feel sick would not be
an informed refusal because the patient holds an unjustified, material,
false belief.'" Regarding inherently contestable material propositions,
Faden and Beauchamp's account requires the professional to communi-
cate her view and the patient to understand that the professional believes
the proposition, although it does not require that the patient believe the
proposition herself.' 99
One phenomenon that can cause a problem for patient understand-
ing is the framing effect: a person's choice can be affected by the way the
options are described.200 For example, people are more likely to choose an
option presented as a seventy-five percent chance of survival than an op-
tion presented as a twenty-five percent chance of death, even though the
risk is exactly the same.20 ' Faden and Beauchamp note that the framing
effect can be used to manipulate patient choice, and they recognize that
framing may endanger substantial understanding.20 2 They recommend
that professionals attempt to avoid the effect by presenting "both sides of
the story," the positive frame as well as the negative frame.203 Generally,
the manipulation of information-the modification of a person's percep-
tions of the options available to her-is incompatible with informed
consent where it causes the person to fail to have substantial understand-
ing.20 Faden and Beauchamp contend that manipulation of information
is unlikely to be compatible with informed consent and recommend
. - . .205
against this practice.
196. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 310.
197. Id.
198. See id at 311.
199. Id. at 310.
200. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psy-
chology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981); Nicholas Bakalar, Translation Matters in
Choices on Data, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011, at D5 (explaining differences in persua-
siveness and patient understanding among ways of conveying statistical information
about treatment effectiveness).
201. See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 320; Young, supra note 192, at 444.
202. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 320-21; BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra
note 9, at 130, 134.
203. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 321.
204. Id. at 362-63.
205. Id at 363; BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 134. Faden and Beauchamp
recognize that there may be circumstances in which informational manipulation is
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Other forms of manipulation do not necessarily act through an ef-
fect on the understanding, in contrast to the phenomena discussed
immediately above; Faden and Beauchamp call this category "psycholog-
ical manipulation," and it includes such strategies as "appeals to
emotional weaknesses[] and the inducing of guilt or feelings of obliga-
tion. 206 If an instance of psychological manipulation is not easily
resistible by the target, then it is incompatible with the condition of
207
substantial noncontrol required for autonomous action. As with in-
formational manipulation, Faden and Beauchamp advise that
professionals completely avoid using psychological manipulation.2 08
With this summary of Faden and Beauchamp's analysis of informed
consent in hand, this Article will now evaluate the degree to which bi-
ased counseling laws ensure that patients' consent to abortion is properly
informed.
2. Biased Counseling Laws' Obstacles to Informed Consent
Faden and Beauchamp see the process of informing a patient as one
that should strive toward effective communication between a profes-
sional and patient. The professional makes disclosures based on what she
finds important and what she predicts that the patient will find im-
portant, and the patient communicates what she finds important.209 A
list of statements inserted into the professional-patient dialogue by a
legislature does not fit with the model. This fact shows why irrelevant
and immaterial statements or disclosures, such as descriptions or pic-
tures of embryos and fetuses at later gestational stages than the patient's
pregnancy, should not be required by informed consent laws. Nor
should ideological or moral statements, which may not conform to the
professional's beliefs and may be unwelcome for the patient. A patient
who subjectively finds such statements relevant should of course men-
tion that in discussions with the health care professionals treating her
and receive the information. The physician has an obligation to answer
justifiable even though it will not result in an informed consent, perhaps because a
principle other than respect for autonomy is controlling. FADEN & BEAucHAMP, supra
note 5, at 363.
206. FADEN & BEAucHAMp, supra note 5, at 365-66. The authors also discuss a third cate-
gory of manipulation: the manipulation of options, which involves direct control
over another option, for example through the use of punishment or reward. Id at
355. This category is not relevant to my purposes here.
207. Id. at 367.
208. Id. at 368.
209. Supra text accompanying note 195.
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the patient's questions, but she should not be legally mandated to pro-
vide information the patient does not find material or want to hear.
Furthermore, some features of biased counseling laws actively stand in
the way of patient autonomy and informed consent, as I explain below.
a. Deception
According to Faden and Beauchamp's account, deception is a form
of manipulation of information that "uses such intentional strategies as
lying, withholding of information, true assertion that omits a vital quali-
fication, and misleading exaggeration in order to cause persons to
believe what is false."210 While not every instance of deception of a pa-
tient is incompatible with informed consent, these techniques are likely
to inhibit substantial understanding and therefore threaten the degree to
which the patient's consent is autonomous. As shown above, many
statements .that biased counseling laws require professionals to make or
present to patients are deceptive. Inasmuch as these statements cause
patients to have false beliefs that are material to their decisions, they de-
crease patient understanding and thereby decrease patient autonomy.
Deceptive statements that are required by laws purported to guarantee
informed consent to abortion therefore make informed consent less like-
ly and are in direct opposition to the laws' declared purpose.
For example, imagine that a Michigan woman with no history of
mental illness or trauma becomes pregnant and believes that having a
baby does not fit with her life plan at the time. She arranges to have an
abortion and is given counseling materials as required by state law. In
those materials, she reads that an abortion may cause her to experience
"depression, feelings of guilt, sleep disturbance, loss of interest in work
or sex, or anger."212 As a result, she forms the false belief that terminating
her pregnancy will significantly increase the likelihood that she experi-
210. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 5, at 363. The intent of the speaker to control the
listener is a necessary feature of deception and all other forms of influence that might
threaten autonomy. Health care professionals who make statements that are required
by law do not necessarily have the intent to control patients' actions-in fact, it is
highly unlikely that they do. However, for my purposes here-as well as for other,
analogous intent requirements in Faden and Beauchamp's theory-I take it that the
intent of the legislature or other government body to discourage abortion satisfies this
intent requirement for biased counseling statements. The professional is a mere in-
termediary.
211. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 333.17015(3)(c) (2011).
212. Id. § 333.17015(1 1)(b)(iii). As another example, Missouri includes "possible adverse
psychological effects associated with the abortion" in its list of risks that must be dis-
closed. Mo. REV. STAT. § 188.027(1)(1)(b)(b) (2011).
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ence these negative effects. She considers the risk of depression, sleep
disturbance, and the other effects to be material to her decision regard-
ing whether to have an abortion. After weighing her belief about the
risks together with all the other factors, she changes her mind and de-
cides to carry her pregnancy to term. This decision is not substantially
autonomous because the woman fails the condition of substantial un-
derstanding:213 she has a false belief about a proposition that is material
to her decision. Because Michigan's biased counseling law caused her to
form that false belief, she refused to have the abortion. According to
Faden and Beauchamp's model, her decision failed to qualify as an in-
formed refusal. For this woman, the law was an obstacle to autonomy
and therefore to informed consent. The same analysis applies to all the
other deceptive statements that biased counseling laws require be made
or offered to patients, such as that abortion increases the risk of breast
214cancer or fertility problems.
In addition to falsehoods like those mandated in Michigan, some
biased counseling laws use true statements that are calculated to mislead.
For example, statements about fetal pain in biased counseling laws are
carefully crafted to present information that is strictly speaking true but
misleading because it does not include key qualifications, including the
fact that there is medical controversy over the ability of fetuses to feel
pain at various stages of gestation. As Faden and Beauchamp recognize,
the manipulation of information is a threat to informed consent when it
prevents patients from achieving substantial understanding. To tell the
patient that, at twenty weeks, a fetus has the anatomical structures nec-
essary to feel pain (which is contested) without going on to explain the
reasons to doubt that the fetus actually does feel pain is to mislead the
patient-that is, to make her think the scientific evidence clearly favors
the conclusion that the fetus can feel pain. If the patient thinks that fetal
pain is relevant to her decision regarding whether to terminate her preg-
nancy, then the disclosure is detrimental to her understanding of a
material fact and as such makes her decision less likely to be a substan-
tially autonomous action.
b. Other Informational Manipulation
Biased counseling materials also attempt to make use of framing ef-
fects to discourage abortions. The Texas materials discuss the negative
risks of abortion procedures at length. The booklet notes the risk of
213. See supra text accompanying notes 183-84.
214. See supra Part II.A.
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death for abortions at various gestational stages, rather than presenting
the information in terms of chances of survival. 215 Lists of other risks are
given for each type of abortion procedure with no information about
the likelihood of occurrence for each listed risk.216 The only discussion of
the positive effects of abortion is a brief mention that some women
"may feel relief that the procedure is over." 2 17 The risks of childbirth are
also mentioned after the statement: "Pregnancy and birth is usually a
safe, natural process although complications can occur. 2 18 Abortion is
also usually a safe procedure, 219 but the booklet does not make that
statement because its wording and organization are designed to discour-
age abortions. This use of framing may lead some patients to have false
beliefs about the relative risks of abortion and childbirth, which could
prevent them from achieving the substantial understanding necessary to
make an autonomous choice regarding pregnancy. termination.
Biased counseling materials usually include information about all
the types of abortion procedures, including procedures that are only
used for later-term pregnancies and which are therefore irrelevant to the
vast majority of abortion patients.220 It is possible that the inclusion of
221
this information, such as descriptions of dilation and extraction, could
confuse a patient and make her think that the procedure she will under-
go will be more involved or more risky than it actually will be. This
confusion would threaten her ability to arrive at a substantial under-
standing.
c. Psychological Manipulation
Psychological manipulation differs from deception and the other
forms of informational manipulation discussed above in that it does not
necessarily threaten the substantial understanding necessary for auton-
omous action. Faden and Beauchamp advise against its use in an
informed consent process because of the risk that the patient will not be
215. TEx. DEP'T OF HEALTH, supra note 57, at 10.
216. Id. at 10-17.
217. Id. at 16.
218. Id. at 17. Similarly, the Louisiana materials state that "[c]ontinuing a pregnancy and
delivering a baby is usually a safe, healthy process," LA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & Hoses.,
supra note 93, at 19.
219. See David A. Grimes, Estimation of Pregnancy-Related Mortality Risk by Pregnancy
Outcome, United States, 1991 to 1999, 194 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 92
(2006) (finding that abortion has the lowest risk of maternal death of all pregnancy
outcomes studied).
220. See, e.g., L. DEP'T OF HEALTH & Hosps., supra note 93, at 11-15.
221. See id. at 14-15.
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able to resist the influence.222 If a professional's psychological manipula-
tion is irresistible for a patient, her decision will be controlled by the
professional and therefore will not be autonomous.
Empirical research shows that appeals to fear can be highly likely to
elicit the recommended course of action due to the power of the negative
22
emotional response, as opposed to persuasion through reasons. 23This
effect may be intensified when the source of the message is perceived as
having a high degree of credibility such as health care professionals or the
224
government. Some statements about risk in counseling materials seem
to be intended to elicit fear rather than provide information for weighing
risks. For example, the West Virginia booklet characterizes abortion as a
"traumatic experience" and warns women that they may develop
PTSD. 25 This statement does not present objective information that can
be used to weigh the risks of various options;226 it just makes abortion
seem frightening.
Pictures of embryos and fetuses at various stages of development
do not convey any information about risks or treatment alternatives.
Anti-abortion forces believe that they convey emotional content that
personifies the embryo or fetus.227 Ultrasound laws in North Carolina,
Oklahoma, and Texas are designed to force patients to listen to a de-
scription of the embryo or fetus, presumably assuming that this will
generate an emotional reaction that will make it harder for patients to
221
go through with abortions. Similarly, fetal pain disclosures are framed
to make it seem more likely that the fetus will feel pain than is true for
the precise reason that their authors intend to increase feelings of guilt,
either to punish the patient or to discourage her from obtaining an abor-
tion.229 These pictures and statements may stimulate an emotional
222. Supra, text accompanying notes 204-06.
223. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Abortion, Persuasion, and Emotion: Implications of Social Sci-
ence Research on Emotion for Reading Casey, 83 WASH. L. REv. 1, 13-20 (2008)
(discussing empirical research on emotional influence and the power of fear and
threats).
224. Id. at 21-22.
225. W. VA. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN RES., supra note 68, at 15.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 73-81 (showing that negative psychological condi-
tions like PTSD are not made more likely by abortion).
227. See CELESTE MICHELLE CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC: COMMUNICATING
SoCIAL CHANGE 82 (1990); Sack, supra note 148 (quoting Focus on the Family
spokesperson as saying, in support of a mandatory ultrasound law: "To be able to put
a face on that baby humanizes this process and really allows the mother to connect.").
228. See supra Part II.E.
229. Tobin, supra note 105, at 125. Inasmuch as statements about fetal pain encourage
patients to seek fetal anesthesia or analgesia, they serve to increase the cost of abor-
tion, see Hannah Stahle, Fetal Pain Legislation: An Undue Burden, 10 QUINNIPLAC
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reaction such as guilt. If this emotional reaction were actually impossible
for the patient to resist as she attempts to decide, it would cause her to fail
the condition of
noncontrol necessary for autonomous action.23 0 This is because an indi-
vidual who acts in accord with an emotion that is irresistible does not
make a choice at all. Unlike being rationally persuaded of prudential or
moral considerations, an irresistible emotion unavoidably compels an
action and prevents the exercise of autonomy.
d. Removal of Patient Control over Procedures and Their Timing
Some features of biased counseling laws remove the patient's ability
to control the course of medical interventions. Many biased consent
laws require patients to wait a fixed amount of time after receiving coun-
seling or an ultrasound. 231 Faden and Beauchamp recognize that placing
a time pressure on patients' decisions is not conducive to informed con-
sent.232 Patients have made a "behavioral commitment" by going to the
provider and may be resistant to information that "challenges the origi-
nal decision," or they may need time to make a decision.233 However,
nothing in Faden and Beauchamp's account provides support for man-
datory waiting periods of fixed length; not every patient in a given state
needs twenty-four hours. Rather, health care professionals should be
sensitive to the possibility that a given patient will benefit from having
more time to decide after the informed consent dialogue has taken place
and tailor the scheduling of the medical intervention accordingly.
e. Failure of Biased Counseling Laws to Promote Well-Being
Faden and Beauchamp allow that the "need to balance competing
moral principles" makes it "possible to have a morally acceptable set of
requirements" for legally effective informed consent that differs from the
view that informed consent is an autonomous authorization.234 In this
section, I examine the possibility that the principle of beneficence might
HEALTH L.J. 251, 268-69 (2007), which is a key strategy in the anti-abortion legisla-
tor's playbook.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 187-190.
231. See supra Part II.F.
232. FADEN & BEAucHAMP, supra note 5, at 325.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 286.
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justify the features of biased counseling laws that threaten patient au-
tonomy.
The principle of beneficence requires physicians to avoid, prevent,
and remove harm while also promoting well-being. 235 Beneficence would
prima facie justify, for example, a doctor withholding information about
a treatment alternative that she knows is markedly less effective than
her recommended treatment in order to prevent the patient from
choosing a course of action that is not the most conducive to the pa-
tient's well-being. This example shows the potential conflict between
beneficence and the principle of respect for autonomy: the patient who
is not informed of the available alternatives when she would consider
this information material does not make an autonomous choice to
pursue the physician's recommended treatment. While many would
maintain that respect for autonomy should overcome the prima facie
force of beneficence in such circumstances, a paternalistic view of
medicine would allow the infringement on autonomy in order to
benefit the patient's health.236
Since biased counseling laws are often criticized for being paternal-
istic,237 it might seem that they can be justified by a model of informed
consent that emphasizes beneficence rather than autonomy. That is, an
ethical position that sees paternalism as positive because it helps patients
do what is in their best interests even when they do not will it, might
provide an ethical grounding for biased counseling laws. 238 There are two
ways that beneficence might justify features of biased counseling laws
that threaten patient autonomy. First, they might discourage abortions,
which would contribute to patient well-being if abortion is always or at
least usually detrimental to well-being. Second, they might allow pa-
235. Id. at 10.
236. Cf BEAucHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 9, at 210 (mentioning arguments that sup-
port "the physician's manipulation of some patients to select proper goals of care").
237. See, e.g., Paula Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduction, 37 Amz. L. REv. 453, 489
(1995) (describing Casey and the biased counseling law it upheld as "paternalism
[that] undermines the independence of women as decisionmakers and furthers the
stereotype that women are emotional and irrational decisionmakers, easily swayed by
authority figures").
238. Beauchamp and Childress, in their influential text discussing the principles of medical
ethics, offer a set of conditions that are necessary for paternalistic acts that damage pa-
tients' autonomy interests to be ethically justified. BEAucHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note
9, at 215-16. In my examination of whether biased counseling laws can be justified
by beneficence, my focus corresponds to two of their conditions: that "[a] patient is
at risk of a significant, preventable harm" and that "[t]he paternalistic action will
probably prevent the harm." Id. at 216. It is likely that the autonomy-damaging fea-
tures of biased counseling laws fail every one of Beauchamp and Childress's
conditions.
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tients who terminate their pregnancies to have better outcomes by pre-
paring them for the experience of having an abortion and the conse-
consequences. However, as I will show, neither justification warrants a
paternalistic application of the principle of beneficence as overruling the
principle of respect for autonomy.
Turning to the first justification, there is little or no evidence that
biased counseling laws actually discourage siginificant numbers of wom-
en from deciding to terminate their pregnancies. Waiting periods create
a logistical obstacle that can significantly delay abortions and may pre-
vent some women from getting abortions altogether,239 but I distinguish
that from discouraging women from deciding in favor of terminating
their pregnancies, just as locking someone in a room may stop them
from taking an action without changing their mind or stopping them
from willing that action. But even assuming that these laws make women
less likely to choose abortions, they cannot be justified by the principle of
beneficence because it is not the case that induced abortion is more det-
rimental to women than childbirth or miscarriage.240 By inventing and
publicizing the idea of "Post-Abortion Syndrome," a supposedly common
negative psychological reaction to abortion, 241 the anti-abortion move-
ment would argue that abortion is harmful to women, but abortion is an
extremely safe procedure.242 The empirical evidence debunking anti-
abortion activists' myths about the harms of abortion is discussed above.
Furthermore, the alternative of childbirth is not without its risks and
burdens.243
As for the second argument, that biased counseling can improve
patient outcomes after abortion, there is little or no evidence supporting
this proposition. It is generally true that informed consent disclosures
can help patients by letting them know what to expect, encouraging
239. Cf Mandy S. Coles et al., How are Restrictive Abortion Statutes Associated with Unin-
tended Teen Birth?, 47 J. ADOLESCENT STUD. 160 (2010) (finding that mandatory
waiting periods are associated with increased rates of unintended birth in teenagers);
Theodore Joyce et al., The Impact of Mississippi's Mandatory Delay Law on Abortions
and Births, 278 J. Am. MED. Ass'N 653 (1992) (finding that Mississippi's mandatory
waiting period "was responsible for a decline in abortion rates and an increase in
abortions performed later in pregnancy").
240. See Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The Comparative Safety of Legal In-
duced Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
215, 215 (2012) ("Legal induced abortion is markedly safer than childbirth.").
241. See supra note 73.
242. See Grimes, supra note 219; Grimes & Creinin, supra note 61; Henshaw, supra note
61.
243. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (explaining the psychological and
physical detriments of raising an unintended child).
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treatment compliance, and so on. Certainly, patients should be in-
formed about what the procedure will entail and its likely side effects.
Many biased counseling laws go further, however, and they do so in
ways that are unlikely to contribute to patient well-being. For one thing,
making a patient believe that a procedure is more dangerous than it real-
ly is-as misleading risk statements do-will only add fear and stress to
her experience of the procedure and potentially make negative effects
more likely through the power of suggestion.245 Similarly, misleading
statements about fetal pain are only likely to increase patient anxiety
without any offsetting benefit.
A waiting period, by itself, does not contribute to positive patient
outcomes after abortion. In addition to the fact that mandatory waiting
periods demean women by assuming they will not take sufficient time
to make their decisions without being forced to, they do nothing to
guarantee women engage in further consideration of the decision during
the waiting period.
Requiring women to listen to a description of their ultrasound or
to the embryonic or fetal heartbeat might also seem to be justified by
the notion that these requirements inform the patient about the moral
status of the embryo or fetus or facilitate an emotional connection with
it.246 Such effects might be thought to ensure that the patient under-
stands what she is destroying. The notion that an unwanted ultrasound
description or auscultation will encourage positive psychological out-
comes through increased patient understanding is one I am aware of no
evidence for. Every abortion patient understands that the procedure will
terminate her pregnancy and that foregoing an abortion will, in the usu-
al course, result in the birth of a child. If a patient does not already
understand these facts when she seeks out an abortion, the generally-
applicable informed consent process requires health care providers to
inform her so.24 7 An ultrasound description or auscultation offers no
new material information.24 Some women may feel better if they hear a
244. See STEPHEN WEAR, INFORMED CONSENT: PATIENT AUTONOMY AND CLINICIAN BE-
NEFICENCE WITHIN HEALTH CARE 54 (2d ed. 1998) (noting empirical evidence that
anxiety is reduced by informed consent and that the felt intensity of pain is decreased
if the patient is warned of its occurrence).
245. Id. at 51 ("[I]f a certain possible side effect of a drug is mentioned, the likelihood that
that side effect will occur is increased.").
246. It is unclear what else an ultrasound could convey to the patient in aid of decision
making. The visual or auditory features of body parts to be operated upon are not
typically thought to be so important to informed consent that the patient should have
them conveyed to her regardless of her wishes.
247. See supra text accompanying note 191.
248. Cf. Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to Protect-
ed Choice, 56 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 351, 381 (2008) (arguing against the idea that
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description of a pre-abortion ultrasound, and some women may feel
worse. 24 9 And health care professionals may be able to predict when ex-
posure to the results of an ultrasound will be distressing for the patient
as a result of their consultation with her; they should have the medical
discretion to refrain from describing it or making the heart tones audi-
ble. Without evidence that all or even most women would fare better as
a result of exposure to pre-abortion ultrasound, supporters of ultrasound
description or auscultation laws cannot claim that such laws are justified
by the principle of beneficence.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine how statements conveying the
state's view of the moral status of the embryo or fetus could improve
patient well-being. One possibility is that such a statement allows the
patient to weigh the state's moral view while making her decision and
prevents her from later learning and being upset by the fact that, in the
eyes of the state she has "terminate[d] the life of a whole, separate,
unique, living human being."250 Of course, there are other views of
abortion. A woman who is told that abortion terminates the life of a
human being and chooses childbirth might later be upset to learn that
other states do not articulate that view or that many moral authorities
espouse contrary views.25' Concern for patient well-being cannot justify
compelling patients to listen to the state's moral views based on
speculative and tenuous future possibilities.
ultrasound provides objective information, because, inter alia, there is "preexisting
public and personal familiarity with and affection for fetal imagery"). Information
conveyed by an ultrasound may be subjectively considered material by some patients;
these patients should convey that to their abortion providers, who would then have
an ethical obligation to provide the information. As I have tried to make clear
throughout this Article, my position that there are ethical problems with the state-
ments that biased counseling laws require does not entail that I oppose such
statements, inasmuch as they are truthful and not misleading, being made to those
patients who request the information.
249. See Post, supra note 3.
250. S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2011). The argument offered in the text
is similar to one used by the Supreme Court to uphold disclosures about embryonic
and fetal development stages. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 882 (1992).
251. See, e g., DAVID FELDMAN, BIRTH CONTROL IN JEWIsH LAW 253-55, 265-66 (1998)
(discussing authorities' views that the embryo or fetus is not a person according to
Jewish law at certain stages of pregnancy); Mary Anne Warren, On the Moral and Le-
gal Status ofAbortion, in BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 434-40 (Thomas A. Mappes & David
DeGrazia eds., 4th ed. 1996) (arguing that fetuses are not persons and therefore have
no right to life); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 133-34 (1973) (discussing the tradi-
tional Christian theological view that, early in pregnancy, the embryo or fetus is not a
person but merely part of the pregnant woman).
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f. The Embryo or Fetus as the Object of Beneficence
Anti-abortion legislators might argue that the beneficence princi-
ple's requirement to avoid harm justifies biased counseling laws that are
intended to make abortion less likely because they prevent harm to em-
bryos and fetuses. The position is that the embryo or fetus is an appro-
appropriate object of beneficence-that is, an entity to which there is a
moral obligation to prevent harm. Therefore, actions that prevent harm
to the embryo or fetus are justified by the principle of beneficence even
where they violate the principle of respect for autonomy. This position
may be grounded on a tenable balancing of the two principles (although
it is a balancing that I believe is incorrect), but the protocols generated
by it cannot legitimately be called "informed consent." This is because
the position justifies controlling an individual's actions in order to pro-
tect others. Indeed, the logical extension of the position is to eliminate
abortion as a choice for women because abortion harms embryos and
fetuses. The position endorses the suspension of autonomy-protective
features of informed consent practices in order to protect the well-being
of embryos and fetuses; it holds that beneficence toward embryos and
fetuses requires that women's ability to consent to abortion be less than
fully voluntary and informed. For those who believe that the destruction
of an embryo or fetus is a moral wrong that outweighs the moral value
of a woman's exercise of self-determination, this may be an attractive
policy position, but it is not one that enhances informed consent.
B. Consent as Shared Decision Making
After Faden and Beauchamp's book, possibly the next most-cited
work on informed consent is Informed Consent: Legal Theory and Clinical
Practice, a guide to the law and ethics of informed consent for clinicians.252
In this book, Jessica Berg and her co-authors present a view of informed
consent as shared decision making between health care professionals and
patients,253 one based squarely on the values of autonomy and patient
252. BERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 4. The first edition of the book has a different author
list, including a different lead author. PAUL S. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CON-
SENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1987). The work is routinely cited in
discussions of informed consent. See, e.g., Joffe & Truog, supra note 167, at 347,
349; James Stacey Taylor, Autonomy and Informed Consent: A Much Misunderstood
Relationship, 38 J. or VALUE INQUIRY 383, 383 (2004).
253. BERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 11. In using joint decision making between physician
and patient as the basis of their view of informed consent, the authors follow physi-
cian Jay Katz, who has strenuously criticized the law's failure to usher in a regime of
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well-being.254 Health care professionals should promote the conditions
that allow autonomous decisions, which includes "avoiding as much as
possible pressures of time [and] dictatorial presentations of information
and options. Berg and her co-authors contend that autonomous deci-
sion making is a right of patients, not an obligation; patients should be
allowed to delegate informed decision making to others whom they
256trust.
When it comes to the information that should be disclosed to pa-
tients, Berg and her co-authors do not provide a firm ethical position
but rather glean "generalizations" from tort cases to offer topics that
physicians should consider.257 They note at the outset that "[t]oo much
information can be as harmful as too little," and warn that information
should be "put into context. 258 Physicians should disclose the nature of
the procedure, including expected benefits. 259 They should discuss risks,
and when .deciding whether to disclose a particular risk, they should
2601 ha
consider its nature, magnitude, probability, and imminence. Risks that
are "common, known, remote, or minor" need not be disclosed. 26' This
means that exaggerated risk statements like those found in some biased
counseling laws are not warranted. Patients should be informed about
shared decision making. See, e.g., Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy
Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 69 (1994); Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A
Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U. PirrT. L. REv. 137 (1977). Another model that takes
shared decision making as crucial is that of Howard Brody, whose view is centered
around the requirement that the physician make her reasoning transparent to the pa-
tient, and the patient must be able to participate in that decision to the extent that
she desires. Howard Brody, Transparency: Informed Consent in Primary Care, 19 HAs-
TINGS CENTER REP. 5, 7 (1989).
254. See, e.g., BERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 18-19, 24, 26. At times, Berg and her co-
authors seem to think that autonomy is the only justification. See, e.g., id. at 319,
324.
255. Id. at 25.
256. Id. at 30-32.
257. Id at 53-65. A key purpose of their discussion seems to be assisting physicians in
avoiding liability for medical malpractice, although occasionally they acknowledge
that ethical and legal requirements may diverge. See, e.g., id. at 58. A comparable
view of the disclosures that are morally required can be found in bioethics textbooks.
See, e.g., GERT ET AL., supra note 192, at 214 (requiring that patients be told about
"significant harms and benefits[,] ... alternative intervention(s) [and] the nature of
the malady").
258. BERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 53.
259. Id. at 54-55, 60-61. "In addition to the type of procedure, relevant information also
includes the duration of the procedure, where it will take place (the physician's office
or a hospital), the need for anesthesia, the type of instruments to be used, and an ex-
planation of the bodily parts affected by the procedure." Id. at 55.
260. Id. at 56.
261. Id. at 57.
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alternatives to the proposed intervention, so that they may make deci-
sions according to their values and goals.2 62 Berg and co-authors
expressly disapprove of government-adopted lists of required disclosures
like those in biased counseling laws, calling them "contrary to the spirit
of the informed consent doctrine" because they detract from the need
f . . .263for personalized communication.
Berg and her co-authors also summarize other legal requirements of
informed consent, noting that patient understanding and voluntariness
are required, although they provide little ethical insight into these con-
cepts beyond pointing out that they are important to patient decision
making.2" They discuss the waiver exception to the legal requirement of
informed consent as well, arguing that the doctrine's "primary objective
... to promote individual self-determination" means that patients
should not be compelled "to receive information they do not want or to
make decisions they do not wish to make." 265 This means that mandato-
ry descriptions and auscultations of ultrasounds are unethical, as is any
irrelevant information that is unwanted, such as detailed descriptions of
surgical procedures or pictures of embryos and fetuses.
The ethical model of informed consent that Berg and her co-authors
prefer is a "process" model, one that assumes that medical decision mak-
ing is not a discrete event.266 It emphasizes a two-way transfer of
information between patient and physician that the authors refer to as
"mutual monitoring. "267 Physicians must offer information in a way that
facilitates patient decision making; Berg and co-authors warn against
greeting patients at the first encounter "with a terrifying list of potential
diagnoses, including remote and usually fatal possibilities." 268 The pa-
tient retains the power to refuse the recommended intervention.269
Berg and her co-authors find it appropriate for discussions between
professional and patient to cover values; they think patients may benefit
262. Id. at 59.
263. Id at 58; see also id. at 185 (recommending that physicians "individualize disclosures
to meet patients' needs [and] avoid sterile repetition").
264. Id. at 65-70.
265. Id at 88. Berg and her co-authors also provide a beneficence-based justification for
waiver: it can protect patients from the potential harmful impact of information or
anxiety of decision making. Id. at 90.
266. Id. at 171; see also id. at 174 ("The basic principle of the process model of informed
consent is that patients should be able to participate in decision-making in every
phase of patient care.").
267. Id. at 171-72. Physicians disclose information about treatment, and patients convey
their concerns, values, and level of understanding of their choices.
268. Id at 172.
269. Id. at 227; see also id at 241 ("[O]ne might say that the opportunity to refuse is the
point of the whole thing.").
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from the physician's perspective on "religious, moral, or emotional is-
sues" when the physician has dealt with a certain situation repeatedly. 270
However, the model does not provide support for a law compelling the
doctor to be the mouthpiece for the government's ideological views.
Berg and her co-authors consider the benefit of value discussions to be
based on the patient's desire for input and the doctor's experience with
similar situations.
Berg and her co-authors express concern about the possible pressure
on patients created by receiving information shortly before a surgery to
which they have already committed. 271 The process model addresses this
by recommending keeping patients well informed throughout the
treatment process. It may seem that the process model would provide
support for a mandatory waiting period of some fixed length. Certainly
the process model is in favor of early discussion of relevant information
and giving patients the time they need to decide. However, not every
patient needs the same amount of time. The solution to time pressures is
to give patients control over time by letting them go home and, if they
decide to proceed, schedule another appointment.
C Consent as a Benefit to Patients
Not all ethicists accept autonomy as the theoretical foundation for
informed consent. Stephen Wear, a philosopher with experience as an
ethical consultant to clinicians, offers an operational account of in-
formed consent. This account seeks to articulate a model of informed
consent that responds to practical problems that clinicians face and of-
fers effective guidance.272 Wear's account is based on beneficence, in that
it derives from a recognition of the ways that informed consent benefits
patients.273 He expresses skepticism about the "new ethos of patient au-
270. Id. at 180. Jay Katz, another supporter of the shared decision making view of in-
formed consent, has expressed doubt that physicians are truly able to understand their
patients' values. See Jay Katz, Informed Consent-Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 69, 75, 88 (1994). Robert Veatch has embraced the
radical proposition that "there is no reason to believe that a physician or any other
expert in only one component of well-being should be able to determine what consti-
tutes the good for another being." Robert M. Veatch, Abandoning Informed Consent,
25 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5, 7 (1995).
271. BERG ET AL., supra note 9, at 182-83.
272. WEAR, supra note 244.
273. See id. at 89; see also id. at 84-85 (stating that his model is justified not by theoretical
arguments, but whether "it credibly provide[s] for and pursue[s] the goods and values
identified"). Since it is based ultimately on beneficence, Wear's model is arguably an
example of principlism, and more specifically, rule utilitarianism. See id. at 88-89
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tonomy," which emphasizes patients' interest in freedom from interfer-
ence and assumes that "if only physicians would stop paternalizing their
patients and provide them with sufficient information, patient autono-
my would blossom forth."2 74
Wear explains that many clinicians view the version of informed
consent resulting from the new ethos to be unattainable and see dangers
in disclosing too much to patients. For example, a version of the placebo
effect means that informing patients of risks and complications makes
them more likely to occur.275 Clinicians also may doubt the benefit to
patients of protecting patient autonomy in cases where its exercise leads
276
to the imprudent refusal of treatment and a tragic outcome. On the
other hand, autonomy is an important value in our society, and partici-
pation in decision making can have medical benefits for patients. There
is evidence that both patient anxiety and the experience of pain are
reduced when patients are well-informed and that well-informed pa-
27
tients are better satisfied and better able to adapt to new situations.
The informed consent process can also improve the physician-patient
relationship, alert physicians to useful information about patients, im-
prove patient compliance with treatment regimes, and aid the pursuit of
preventive goals.278 Wear articulates a model of informed consent that
can be used as a medical management tool to reap these benefits.
Wear's model views informed consent as a structured discussion be-
tween physician and patient that takes place in a process of establishing
trust and information sharing and may lead to a longer, more wide-
ranging discussion over time. 279 The informed consent event proceeds in
three stages. First, a comprehensive disclosure broadly informs the pa-
tient about her diagnosis, the recommended treatment and its risks and
benefits, and alternative treatment options.280 The interaction at this
stage is designed to alert the clinician to patient hesitance, misconcep-
(discussing the relationship of the model to prior theoretical commitments and the
principle of beneficence). Although there are many formulations of rule utilitarian-
ism, the basic thrust of the theory is that the ethical character of an act is determined
by whether it is in compliance with a rule that would lead, in most applications, to
the greatest good for the greatest number. Childress, supra note 173, at 19-20.
274. WEAR, supra note 244, at 171-72. See also James Stacey Taylor, Autonomy and In-
formed Consent: A Much Misunderstood Relationship, 38 J. VALUE INQUIRY 383 (2004)
(arguing that concern for human well-being, rather than autonomy, is the conceptual
basis for informed consent).
275. WEAR, supra note 244, at 51 (describing "nocebo" effect); see also id. at 107.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 54 (citing studies).
278. Id. at 72-76.
279. Id. at 96-98.
280. Id. at 101-16.
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tions, or a desire for more information.28 1 Second, the core disclosure
focuses on the actual choice the patient must make and requires the
physician to explain her recommendation.282 Third, the patient is asked
to give feedback by summarizing her understanding of the disclosures
and asking any questions she may have.283 At the end of this process, the
physician formally requests the patient's consent to the recommended
284
treatment. Wear recognizes the traditional exceptions to physicians'
obligation to obtain informed consent to treatment: patient incompe-
tence, emergencies, patient waiver, and the therapeutic privilege.285
Wear's model does not allow the physician to make a recommenda-
tion where the choice involves subjective, value-laden judgments.286 This
can come about when there are multiple options available that are equal-
ly reasonable from a medical point of view. Wear expressly includes
abortion in the category of decisions on which the physician should not
make a recommendation because "the values at stake are so profound
and personal that only the patient can speak to them."287 It is an impli-
cation of this feature of the model that ideological or moral statements
without medical content should not be a part of the informed consent
event.
Physicians should "give an accurate rendition of the risk and com-
plication profile of a given intervention.,288 One of the goals of the
informed consent event is to develop trust between physician and pa-
tient,289 which requires that the physician not lead the patient astray. At
281. Id. at 101.
282. Id. at 116-22.
283. Id. at 122-24.
284. Id. at 124.
285. Id. at 156. However, Wear is so skeptical of therapeutic privilege that it may be accu-
rate to say that it is not a valid exception on his model. See id. at 169. As is the case
with other accounts of informed consent, the presence of an emergency exception
highlights an ethical problem for laws that do not include such exceptions for
emergencies. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-34 (2011) (requiring that the
pre-abortion ultrasound be performed and the patient be afforded the chance to
view it and listen to embryonic or fetal heart tones, without exception for medical
emergencies). Furthermore, Wear holds that the question of whether there is an
emergency should be left "to objective medical judgment." WEAR, supra note 244, at
170. This casts doubt on the ethical validity of laws that have narrowly crafted excep-
tions. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE 14-02.1-02(9) (2011).
286. WEAR, supra note 244, at 115; see also id. at 163 (recommending against allowing
patients to waive informed consent and decision making in such situations); cf id. at
121 (discussing the effect of a profound and personal choice at the core disclosure
stage).
287. Id. at 71 (listing elective abortion as a "clear example").
288. Id. at 107-08.
289. Id. at 101
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the comprehensive disclosure stage, risks should be identified along with
their likelihood of occurrence.290 Major risks with a high magnitude (for
example, death or paralysis) and high percentage of occurrence should
be emphasized. 291' Risks should be discussed in the context of counter-
balancing benefits and a comparison of the risks of other options,
including non-treatment.292 This discussion should be narrowed to ma-
jor risks at the core disclosure stage.
293
Although Wear recognizes the legitimacy of the principle, "when in
doubt, mention it,"29 at the comprehensive disclosure stage, his model
never sanctions making inaccurate statements about risks. It holds that
"[a] false understanding of the essential facts ... renders the incorporat-
ing decision-making process invalid." 295 Wear requires that percentages
of occurrence of risks be mentioned and requires balancing risk disclo-
sures in the context of benefits and the risk profiles of alternatives.296
Some states' abortion counseling laws fail to satisfy this model. They
require physicians to make inaccurate statements about risks, as demon-
strated above. They mention risks of abortion without explaining their
likelihood and offer one-sided information about risks, focusing on neg-
ative risks of abortion without mentioning the benefits of abortion or, in
some cases, the risks of childbirth. Counseling materials make warnings
about high-magnitude risks like breast cancer and infertility without
offering information about the low percentage of occurrence of those
risks or the fact that abortion does not increase them.29 7
According to Wear's model, detailed actual understanding on the
part of the patient is not necessarily a goal of informed consent; some
patients may benefit from it, others may not.29 8 Indeed, Wear thinks that
"we should be willing to respect the patient's autonomy . . . in the sense
that he does not want very much detail and is willing to rely on the phy-
sician's judgment."299 The model accommodates different levels of
290. Id. at 108 (recommending that major risks be mentioned individually "with at-
tendant statistics").
291. Id. at 109-10.
292. Id. at I11.
293. Id. at 121.
294. Id. at 109.
295. Id. at 151.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 290-292.
297. See supra Part II.A.
298. WEAR, supra note 244, at 173.
299. Id. at 124 (emphasis omitted) say (discussing the third stage of the informed consent
event and supporting broad disclosures at the first stage); id. at 135 (" [Pleople auton-
omously choose to pursue quite varying degrees of understanding, in health care as in
all other areas of human endeavor, and [] such choices should generally be hon-
ored.").
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disclosure in different circumstances, contrary to the one-size-fits-all
mandatory disclosures of many biased counseling laws. Furthermore,
Wear's model recognizes the waiver exception, allowing patients to waive
the disclosures normally owed them and letting the physician make the
decision as to the appropriate intervention.3 00 Wear thinks that physi-
cians should not allow patients to use waiver to abdicate personal and
profound decisions.' But the patient who has made the personal and
profound decision to terminate her pregnancy and does not want to be
told about the graphic details of the procedure or hear a description of
her ultrasound is not attempting a waiver that is problematic in this
sense. Rather, she is exercising control over whether she receives infor-
mation that goes beyond the core disclosures that she needs in order to
make a responsible choice about the intervention.
Because a solicitation of patient hesitation and confusion is built
into this model,302 it does not support mandatory waiting periods. The
physician has a responsibility to address patient apprehension, which
may include recommending that the patient take some time to reflect.
But Wear's model gives no reason to think that requiring all patients to
wait a given number of hours between the provision of information and
the procedure adds anything to the quality of patients' decision making
or otherwise benefits patients.
Wear's model does not expressly emphasize that disclosures be lim-
ited to information that is relevant to the patient's circumstance, but the
notion can be inferred from his discussion of the comprehensive disclo-
sure. He lists the types of information that should be disclosed as "the
patient's overall medical condition, the specific problem for which
treatment is being recommended, the treatment recommended with its
attendant benefits and risks, any alternative modalities, and the progno-
sis without treatment."0o3 Risks of procedures that are not appropriate to
the patient's situation, such as abortion procedures used at later gesta-
tional stages, do not appear on the list.
D. Consent as Waiver
In their book Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics, Neil Manson
and Onora O'Neill reject the standard view that informed consent is jus-
300. Id. at 162-66.
301. Id. at 163-64.
302. Id. at 112 (explaining that one of the goals of the comprehensive disclosure is to rule
out "hesitancy and ambivalence on the patient's part").
303. Id. at 102.
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tified by respect for autonomy. Instead, their account is deontological in
that it focuses on rights and obligations. It is centered on the insight
that informed consent changes the character of an action from a viola-
tion of a norm, right, or obligation into an ethically or legally acceptable
action.304 For example, if A stabs B with a needle, A commits battery and
violates B's right to bodily integrity. However, if A stabs B with a needle
because A is taking a sample of B's blood with B's consent, then A has
not wronged B thereby.30' Informed consent in medicine is justified
not by a need to protect autonomy, but by the need to waive im-
portant norms in order for treatment to be possible.' Manson and
O'Neill describe informed consent as more than mere disclosure, but
rather a communicative transaction that is "governed and constrained
by a rich normative framework,"307 including norms of "intelligibility,
relevance, accuracy and honesty."3 08 A transaction that satisfies these
communicative norms can waive specific rights, such as the right not
to be battered.o'
Manson and O'Neill describe the standard view regarding informed
consent as one that strives to make consent more explicit and specific
because it is conceived as the disclosure of information needed for au-
tonomous decision making."o They argue that this effort has resulted in
standards that are overly formalistic and impossible to satisfy in prac-
tice."' They also question the "general agreement that informed consent
is required for the sake of autonomy, and that autonomy is a basic ethi-
cal value."312 They are skeptical about this supposed agreement because
they diagnose substantive disagreement within the field of medical eth-
ics regarding how to conceive of autonomy, its importance to the field,
313and its connection to informed consent.
304. MANSON & O'NEILL, supra note 167, at 72-73.
305. See Neil C. Manson, Consent and Informed Consent, in PRINCIPLES OF HEALTH CARE
ETHICs 297, 297-98 (Richard E. Ashcroft et. al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).
306. See MANSON & O'NEILL, supra note 167, at 72-77, 94-96, 188. Beauchamp has
questioned whether Manson and O'Neill have really replaced autonomy as the justi-
fication for informed consent or whether their preferred justification is itself
supported by respect for autonomy. Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and Consent, in
THE ETHICS OF CONSENT, supra note 167, at 55, 60.
307. MANSON & O'NEILL, supra note 167, at ix.
308. Id. at xi.
309. Cf id. at 72-73.
310. Id. at 6-11, 32-33.
311. Id. at 11, 15-16.
312. Id at 17.
313. Id at 17-22. Beauchamp has noted that, while there are problems with the literature
on autonomy, there are similar problems with the literature regarding the concepts
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Part of the motivation of Manson and O'Neill's account is their
view of the deficiencies present in common ways of thinking about the
communication of information: the container and conduit metaphors.
Information is commonly thought of as material that is contained
somewhere-it is possessed by people or stored in written texts, for ex-
ample.314 A related view is that the act of communication is the
conveyance or transfer of information through some conduit, such as
speech. 3 15 Manson and O'Neill point out that this way of thinking ob-
scures the crucial importance of context, communicative norms, and
background expectations .
Among the norms governing communication are epistemic
norms-norms concerning knowledge. Speakers" who make asser-
tions-that is, statements that represent the world if they are true-have
an epistemic responsibility to communicate the way the world actually is
to others."' Speakers have a responsibility to their listeners not to do
things that are likely to mislead them, including apparently asserting a
fact when actually doing something else. A pair of examples of the im-
portance of context to communication will illustrate the point. The
actor on stage does not mislead the audience when she shouts, "The
building is on fire Aunt Matilda, everybody leave!"' But the person
who shouts the same thing in a crowded train station is likely to lead
people to have mistaken beliefs that will affect their behavior. In addi-
tion to this responsibility not to engage in communicative acts that
would lead the audience to believe things the speaker does not believe to
be true, speakers have a responsibility to their audiences not to make
assertions that they sincerely believe but for which they do not have suf-
ficient evidence.320 For this reason, listeners are entitled to engage
speakers in a "two-way exchange" and ask for the grounds for their asser-
tions.3 2' Thus, statements in abortion counseling materials that are not
well supported by scientific evidence, such as claims about an increased
that Manson and O'Neill's account depends on. Tom L. Beauchamp, Autonomy and
Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT, supra note 167, at 55, 60.
314. MANSON & O'NEILL, supra note 167, at 36.
315. Id. at 35.
316. Id. at 38-41, 48-49.
317. For stylistic reasons, I primarily use the language of speaking and listening here, alt-
hough I am discussing all communication. Nothing in Manson and O'Neill's
account hinges on differences between speaking and other forms of communication.
318. MANSON & O'NEILL, supra note 167, at 59-60.
319. Id. at 59.
320. Id. at 61.
321. Id. at 62.
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risk of breast cancer or the likelihood of fetal pain, violate epistemic
norms.
Another communicative norm is that of relevance to the audience's
interests and practical commitments. For example, the assertion that
"nickel melts at 1,455 degrees [Celsius]" satisfies various communicative
norms; it is true, epistemically justified, comprehensible, and so on.32
But if a speaker utters that statement when called on to give a lifeguard
training, or when the listener's house is on fire, the speaker has failed
to satisfy the norm of relevance to the audience's interests. "Good
communicative practice therefore always involves withholding infor-
mation-comprehensible, true, grounded information-that could
have been conveyed."323 This norm highlights a problem with the
standard view's urge for greater specificity in informed consent disclo-
sures: too much specificity may harm the ethical adequacy of a
communicative transaction.324 It also shows the ethical problem with
biased counseling laws that require the description of graphic details of
abortion procedures, especially those that the patient will not undergo,
or descriptions of patients' ultrasounds. Because such disclosures are not
relevant to patients' interests, providing them violates the norms of
communicative transactions.
As I have explained, Manson and O'Neill hold that the ethical jus-
tification of informed consent is that it constitutes a waiver of ethical
and legal requirements. 25 Their position entails that the scope of in-
formed consent requirements is not determined by the prerequisites for
autonomy, but by the ethical and legal norms that are at play in a given
circumstance.32 For the same reason, the authors are skeptical of at-
tempts to impose uniform standards on informed consent practices,
such as lists of mandated disclosures.327 They argue that, for a routine in-
tervention like taking a blood sample, a patient's rolling up her sleeve and
extending her arm is sufficient implied consent, and that an explanation
of the procedure from the nurse is not necessary.'2 In diagnosing and
322. Id. at 63.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 67. ("It is not always necessary-and it may even be wrong-to influct full
details about a medical intervention upon a patient.").
325. Cf John Kleinig, The Nature of Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT, supra note
167, at 3, 4, 10 (describing consent as a communicative transaction that can trans-
form moral relations between agents).
326. MANSON & O'NEILL, supra note 167, at 78-79, 83, 189.
327. Id. at 80.
328. Id. at 81. However, if the patient expressed a refusal or the nurse deceived the patient
about the procedure or used force to obtain a sample, the ethical character of the
nurse's act would of course change. Id
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proposing a treatment, a physician's use of "simplified language that omits
much detail" may be ethically appropriate as long as the physician "does
not deceive or manipulate the patient, and the subsequent treatment does
not force or coerce."3 29 In addition, rare and minor risks can ethically be
left unmentioned, since there is a limit to how much can be disclosed."o
Biased counseling laws' long lists of low-frequency risks are therefore not
supported by this model.
On the other hand, where the treatment is complex or unfamiliar
or comes with high risks or significant side effects, informed consent
standards demand greater specificity and explicitness.33' Most fund-
mentally, "[c]onsent is a way of ensuring that those subjected to invasive
interventions are not abused, manipulated or undermined, or wronged
in comparably serious ways.. .. [W]hat matters will vary depending on
the case at hand; and more is not always better. "33 2 Nevertheless, the au-
thors acknowledge that "[a]ny request for consent will include some
account of a proposed action or intervention, and of the effects-
including risks and benefits-that are thought likely."333
Manson and O'Neill hold that the disclosures made in the in-
formed consent process must be intelligible, relevant to patients, and
"adequately accurate" given "each party's background knowledge and
inferential competencies. 334 The epistemic norms that govern commu-
nication also demand that communication is not dishonest, which rules
out the use of "exaggeration, omission of important qualifications and
mere confusion," 335 as well as communications that "mislead or manipu-
late."3' Furthermore, patients "do not offer genuine consent or refusal
when ... they . . . base consent or refusal on their misunderstandings"
of proposed interventions. 337 As is the case with other ethical accounts of
informed consent, this view condemns misleading statements and those
that omit qualifications, such as fetal pain statements and statements
about psychological consequences of abortion.
329. Id. at 81; see also id. at 66 ("[B]eing truthful, relevant and responsive to the intended
audience's interests[] may in some contexts be sufficient for ethically sound informed
consent practices.").
330. Id. at 190.
331. Id. at 81-82.
332. Id. at 82.
333. Id. at 87.
334. Id. at 88. The notion of adequate accuracy is contrasted with the goals of full specific-
ity and explicitness, which the authors reject. See id. at 90.
335. Id. at 86.
336. Id. at 185.
337. Id. at 93.
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A key aspect of their view is that Manson and O'Neill recognize the
ability of patients to make judgments of reliability and trustworthiness
about health care professionals. 1 8 This is one of the facts that justifies a
patient's decision to not try to learn everything about a given interven-
tion prior to consenting. After all, patients hire professionals precisely
because they have expertise that patients do not, and trusting the rec-
ommendation of a professional without insisting on being informed of
every detail can be entirely rational.339
Carefully applying Manson and O'Neill's account to abortion-
specific counseling laws requires examining the norms that would be
violated by the termination of a pregnancy in the absence of patient
consent. Before discussing the laws themselves, it is important to clarify
what Manson and O'Neill's account ethically requires of informed con-
sent to abortion. There is widespread agreement that the destruction of
a wanted pregnancy would be a serious moral wrong, resulting in tort
and criminal consequences in many states."' These norms protect pro-
spective mothers' interests in the continuation of their pregnancies, and
for many people they express the value of the pregnancy, whether its
metaphysical status is seen as potential life or as a person. Informed con-
sent to abortion, therefore, must be sufficient to ensure that the patient
waives these norms. This requires making certain that the patient under-
stands that an abortion is the destruction of the pregnancy and is
irreversible, as well as making certain that the patient wants to end her
pregnancy. This much would be required by the generally applicable
informed consent laws that exist in every state. Assuming that the norms
surrounding the termination of pregnancy differ depending on the stage
of the pregnancy-that is, many would find that the gestational age of
the pregnancy is relevant to the moral significance of its destruction-
Manson and O'Neill's account would presumably counsel a disclosure of
the gestational age and information about the developmental features of
the pregnancy. Given their emphasis on relevance and two-way commu-
nication, Manson and O'Neill would surely require that the provider
elicit from the patient what she finds important and answer any of her
questions.
338. Id. at 154-67, 192.
339. Cf id. at 192.
340. See, e.g., Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d. 787 (S.D. 1996) (interpreting
the South Dakota wrongful death statute to authorize a cause of action for the death
of a fetus, surveying other jurisdictions); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830,
832 (Iowa 1983) (holding that a pregnant woman could recover for loss of consorti-
um in a case of fetal death); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 208-C (2011) (providing
that causing the termination of a pregnancy without consent of the pregnant woman
is "elevated aggravated assault").
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Biased counseling laws go further than the requirements just
mentioned, however. They include exaggerated and misleading
information about risks of serious outcomes like infertility and
psychological problems. Such statements violate communicative norms
requiring adequate accuracy and the inclusion of qualifying statements.
For example, Michigan requires that patients be told that "as the result of
an abortion, some women may experience depression, feelings of guilt,
sleep disturbance, loss of interest in work or sex, or anger."34' This
statement is literally true, but it omits relevant qualifications. Most
women who get abortions do not experience significant problems like
those mentioned, and most women who do have negative psychological
outcomes after abortions experienced other stressors prior to .and
distinct from their abortions. 2 The statement is calculated to mislead
patients into thinking the risk is greater than it really is, which makes it
a violation of the epistemic norms that govern informed consent
transactions. Note that the strength of the norms that are waived by
consent to abortion does nothing to justify misleading statements about
risk. Those norms condemn the termination of a wanted pregnancy.
Tricking a woman into continuing to carry an unwanted pregnancy by
telling her she will be harmed by the abortion procedure does not serve
norms against the destruction of wanted pregnancies.
As we have seen, Manson and O'Neill's maxim that a speaker
should make her statements relevant to the listener's interests shows that
irrelevant information does not enhance informed consent. For the same
reason, patients should not be forced to hear information that they af-
firmatively state they do not want to hear. This counsels against
mandatory statements generally, and certainly rules out requirements to
listen to a description of an ultrasound or the embryonic or fetal heart-
beat. Those women who feel that viewing or listening to a description of
an ultrasound, or listening to heart tones, is relevant to their decision are
free to request the information; other women should not have it forced
upon them. Statements about the moral or metaphysical status of the
embryo or fetus do not fare any better. A woman who wants this kind of
information is able to seek it out, whether from a health care profession-
al or an authority on such matters. As before, the norms that protect
wanted pregnancies from destruction provide no justification for impos-
ing information on a woman who is seeking to terminate her pregnancy.
341. MICH. COMP. LAws § 333.17015(11)(b)(iii) (2011). As another example, Missouri
includes "possible adverse psychological effects associated with the abortion" in its list
of risks that must be disclosed. Mo. REv. STAT. § 188.027(1)(1)(b)(b) (2011).
342. See supra Part lI.A.2.
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Finally, mandatory waiting periods are not supported by Manson
and O'Neill's approach to informed consent. The authors are opposed to
uniform consent procedures generally,4 3 and therefore would not favor
the idea that every patient ought to wait a standard amount of time,
even if some patients ought to be given time to consider their options.
Their model calls for a two-way communicative transaction in which
the patient knowingly waives norms that would otherwise forbid the
344termination of her pregnancy, not a mandatory time out.
E. Consent as a Fair Transaction
Franklin Miller and Alan Wertheimer argue against the standard
autonomous authorization theory propounded by Faden and Beau-
champ and offer in its place a "fair transaction" model of consent," on
which consent serves the values of both autonomy and well-being.' For
these authors, the central ethical question is whether a consent transac-
tion is "morally transformative and, in particular, whether a consent
transaction renders it permissible for [the person seeking consent] to pro-
ceed."47 Their model recognizes the bilateral nature of consent
transactions and holds that "A is morally permitted to proceed on the ba-
sis of a consent transaction if A has treated B fairly and responds in a
reasonable manner to B's token or expression of consent or what A rea-
sonably believes is B's token or expression of consent. 3 48
Miller and Wertheimer's model generates different results about
morally effective consent than the autonomous authorization model
because it holds that valid consent is neither necessary nor sufficient for
moral transformation." For example, they describe the following case:
A, a department chair, says, "I'm going to appoint C to our new posi-
tion unless anyone objects." B is daydreaming, and says nothing. A
assumes that B has authorized him to appoint C.350 B has not given valid
consent because she is not aware of the proposal and does not authorize
it, so B would not be permitted to proceed on the autonomous authori-
zation model. However, A is reasonable in believing that B has
343. MANSON & O'NEILL, supra note 167, at 190-9 1.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 307-08.
345. Miller & Wertheimer, supra note 167, at 79, 81.
346. Id. at 83.
347. Id. at 79.
348. Id. at 8 1; see also id. at 94.
349. Id. at 99-101.
350. Id. at 85.
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consented, and it is morally permissible for A to proceed on the fair
transaction model.35'
The characteristics that allow consent to be morally transformative-
voluntariness, information, and competence-are explained by the fair
transaction model.352 In medicine, where there is a dramatic difference in
knowledge between the parties, a concern with fairness requires a greater
obligation on the more knowledgeable party to volunteer information
(as opposed to merely refraining from deception).353 On the other hand,
if a person seeking consent coerces, deceives, or takes advantage of the
incapacity of another, she is not morally permitted to proceed because
she has not treated the other fairly.' Thus, the model gives force to the
intuition that the patient who has been given exaggerated risk state-
ments-like those required by some biased counseling laws-when
deciding whether to terminate her pregnancy has been wronged. A pa-
tient decision based on a deceptive statement is not morally
transformative and therefore does not permit the health care professional
to proceed.
Franklin and Wertheimer contend that the explicitness of consent
in the medical context depends on the nature of the treatment at is-
sue.3 ' The patient's assumption that the physician has an obligation to
promote her interests is also relevant, since we demand less explicit in-
formation when considering the recommendation of someone we trust
to act in our interests."' Furthermore, the authors believe that patients
ought to have control over the information they receive. They describe a
case in which a doctor tells her patient that she needs surgery for breast
cancer and begins to explain the options, but the patient interrupts, say-
ing, "I trust you; do whatever you think is best."357 It is permissible for
the doctor to proceed with surgery even though the patient's consent is
not fully informed because the doctor has treated the patient fairly by
attempting to provide material information.358 To say otherwise would
be unfair to the doctor, who has an obligation to treat, as well as to the
patient, who wants to be cured but does not want certain information.
A patient may have a rational interest in avoiding the expenditure of
"time, mental energy, psychic stress, and money" that it takes to acquire
351. Id. at 98, 100-01.
352. Id. at 94-95.
353. Id at 95.
354. Id at 94. Some instances of deception are compatible with fair treatment, such as a
buyer deceiving a seller in negotiation about the highest price she is willing to pay.
355. Id. at 91-92.
356. Id
357. Id at 87.
358. Id at 88.
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and understand relevant information, especially where she has "confi-
dence that the authorized intervention is in her interest.""' Thus, the
mandatory provision of information, including information gleaned
from ultrasounds, disrespects patients' positive autonomy interest in
360proceeding with the intervention on their terms.
On this model, the fact that biased counseling laws require state-
ments be made to every patient causes ethical problems because it
interferes with the patient's control over what kind of interaction should
permit the health care provider to proceed with an intervention. When a
legislature attempts to prevent a woman from getting an abortion where
she has not been exposed to all the information that lawmakers want her
to be, it "compromise[s] the facilitative function of consent transactions
by disabling her from entering into transactions and relationships that
she seeks.""' Ultimately, whether any given counseling statement is ethi-
cal depends on its effect on the fairness of the transaction. The demands
of fairness are satisfied by offering information that is relevant to the
decision at hand, such as risks and benefits. Irrelevant information and
moral statements do not improve the fairness of consent transactions.
Of course, such information ought to be available to those patients who
seek it out. Ultrasound descriptions or auscultations should be offered
when an ultrasound is performed, but the patients' wishes should con-
trol. Finally, a mandatory waiting period does nothing to facilitate a fair
transaction; on the contrary, the logistical obstacles that waiting periods
present only decrease fairness by constraining patient decision making.
E Professional Associations' Positions
The features of biased counseling laws that deviate from the philo-
sophical accounts of medical ethics are also in conflict with the ethics
positions, statements, and codes of professional associations in medicine.
Physicians often consider professional associations to be authorities re-
garding the ethical obligations that physicians face. This section
discusses the ethical pronouncements of two influential professional as-
sociations, the American Medical Association and the American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. These pronouncements do not pro-
vide support for the problematic features of biased counseling laws.
359. Id. at 93.
360. Id. at 84.
361. Id.
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1. The American Medical Association
The American Medical Association ("AMA") is the nation's largest
professional association of physicians and medical students. It aims to
"promote the art and science of medicine and the betterment of public
health."3 62 The AMAs Code of Medical Ethics "establish[es] the core
ethical principles of the medical profession."3 63 This code explains that
informed consent allows patients to exercise their "right of self-
decision."'6 "The physician's obligation is to present the medical facts
accurately to the patient" in order to assist patients in making choices.6
The code exhorts physicians to "sensitively and respectfully disclose all
relevant medical information," and recommends that "[the quantity
and specificity of this information should be tailored to meet the prefer-
ences and needs of individual patients."3" The Code of Medical Ethics
appears to reject the therapeutic privilege, stating that "[w]ithholding
medical information from patients without their knowledge or consent
is ethically unacceptable." 367 Physicians should avoid conflicts between
the obligations to further patient well-being and to respect patient au-
tonomy through truth-telling by proactively learning what patients'
preferences are regarding communication of information.368 Finally,
"physicians should honor patient requests not to be informed of certain
medical information."369
There is no doubt that the abortion-specific biased counseling stat-
utes discussed fail the AMAs ethical standards, especially since the AMA
362. About AMA, AM. MED. Ass'N, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/publabout-ama/our-
mission.page (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
363. Developing AMA Policies, AM. MED. Ass'N, http://www.ama-assn.orglamalpub/
about-ama/our-people/house-delegates/developing-ama-policies.page (last visited
Mar. 18, 2012).
364. AMA Code of Medical Ethics, AM. MED. Ass'N, at Opinion 8.08 (2006),
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-
ethics.page. The AMA recognizes patient autonomy as a key value. See id. at Opinion
5.059 (2001), Opinion 10.02 (2001).
365. Id. at Opinion 8.08 (2006).
366. Id.
367. Id at Opinion 8.082.
368. Id.
369. Id.; see alo AM. MED. Ass'N, REPORT ON THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL
AFFAIRS, REP. No. 2-A-06, WITHHOLDING INFORMATION FROM PATIENTS (THERA-
PEUTIC PRIVILEGE) 3 (2006), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/
doc/code-medical-ethics/8082a.pdf ("To respect patients' rights of decisional au-
tonomy, physicians must offer all patients the opportunity to receive relevant
medical information. This may be accomplished by asking patients to specify the
scope of information they wish to receive and their preferred methods for receiving
it. Physicians should then honor these preferences to the extent practicable.").
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"opposes legislative measures that would impose procedure-specific re-
quirements for informed consent or a waiting period for any legal
medical procedure."o70 The requirement that physicians present facts
accurately disqualifies deceptive and misleading statements. Making
statements that the patient does not want to hear is unethical according
to the AMA, and the patient's expressed desire not to be given certain
information should be respected. Finally, there is nothing that provides
support for forcing patients to be exposed to the results of an ultrasound
against their wishes.
2. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
("ACOG") is the leading professional association dedicated to educat-
ing physicians who provide health care for women."' The ACOG
Code of Professional Ethics requires that physicians "deal honestly
with patients."372 In its discussion of informed consent, the code states
that the physician must "present to the patient ... pertinent medical
facts and recommendations consistent with good medical practice."373
Disclosures should include treatment alternatives, "objectives, risks, ben-
efits, possible complications, and anticipated results of such
,,374treatment.
ACOG's ethics committee has issued an opinion regarding
informed consent. It recognizes that the purposes of informed consent
are respect for bodily integrity and patient self-determination.37 ' The
370. AM. MED. Ass'N, POLICY No. H-320.951, AMA OPPOSITION TO PROCEDURE-
SPECIFIC" INFORMED CONSENT, available at https://ssl3.ama-assn.org/apps/ecomm/
PolicyFinderForm.pl?site=www.ama-
assn.org&uri=/amal/pub/upload/mm/PolicyFinder/policyfiles/HnE/H-320.951.HTM
(last visited Apr. 3, 2012).
371. ACOG recently split into two legal entities: the American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists continues the group's educational mission and produces practice
guidelines, and the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists engages in
various forms of advocacy and professional discipline.
372. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs 1
(2011), available at http://www.acog.org/-/media/About%20ACOG/acogcode.pdf
?dmc= 1 &ts=20120404TO 133267795.
373. Id. at 2.
374. Id.
375. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE ON ETHICS OPINION
No. 439, INFORMED CONSENT 1, 2-3 (2009), available at http://www.acog.org/
ResourcesAndPublications/CommitteeOpinions/Committee onEthics/Informed
Consent (follow "PDF Format" hyperlink) [hereinafter ACOG OPINION ON IN-
FORMED CONSENT].
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patient's comprehension of her situation and options is necessary, and
"free consent is an intentional and voluntary choice that authorizes" a
medical intervention.13' ACOG envisions informed consent as "a dialogue
between patient and health care provider in support of respect for
patient autonomy."'7 The opinion does not list required disclosures. It
sets out "significant categories for disclosure," which are the nature of
the patient's medical condition, the nature and risks of the proposed
treatment, and alternatives." Physicians determine what should be
disclosed within each of these categories by considering professional
practice, the expectations of ordinary patients, and the unique needs of
the individual patient.7 7 The opinion endorses physicians making
recommendations and trying to persuade patients to follow them, as
long as physicians avoid deception, manipulation, and coercion.so
The ethics committee also recognizes that patients may waive their
right to informed consent by "refusing information necessary to make
an informed decision.""' Respecting a patient's wish not to receive cer-
tain information, is itself an. expression of respect for autonomy,
although the ethics committee warns that "waivers should not be ac-
cepted complacently without some concern for the causes of the
patient's desire not to participate in the management of her care." 8 2
With its emphasis on "knowledge about and understanding of all
the available options"'' and the "professional responsibilit[y] to be hon-
est," 84 ACOG disapproves of false and misleading statements to
patients. Similarly, the organization's disapproval of manipulation indi-
cates ethical problems with the disclosure of irrelevant but emotionally
charged information like pictures of late-term fetuses. Furthermore, to
require women to listen to a verbal description of the ultrasound image
or embryonic or fetal heart tones against their wishes violates ACOG's
instruction that "[tihe patient should join with the physician in decid-
ing the amount of diagnostic information that is appropriate for making
intelligent choices."'3' ACOG's recommendations for the content of dis-
376. Id. at 3. This account hews closely to Faden and Beauchamp's autonomous authori-
zation model of informed consent. Cf id. at 5 n.t, 8 (listing Faden and Beauchamp's
book as a reference).
377. Id. at 4.
378. Id. at 5.
379. Id.
380. Id
381. Id. at 7.
382. Id
383. Id. at 3.
384. Id. at 7.
385. AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE ON ETHICS OPIN-
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closures do not include moral statements, such as those about the moral
status of the embryo or fetus. Nothing in ACOG's ethics guidance pro-
vides support for mandatory waiting periods.
ACOG, like other ethics authorities, maintains that patients are
able to waive their right to informed consent by refusing material in-
formation."' This Article does not criticizee biased counseling laws for
forcing patients to receive information that is necessary for informed
consent even when the patients do not want that information. Rather, it
argues that the statements and information biased counseling laws re-
quire patients to receive are not necessary for, and are often harmful to,
informed consent. However, there is a logical relationship between the
two propositions: if patients have a right to refuse the information nec-
essary for informed consent, then a fortiori they have the right to refuse
information that is unnecessary for informed consent.
CONCLUSION
The views of informed consent examined above come from philos-
ophers, physicians, medical researchers, hospital ethics consultants,
lawyers, and professional medical associations. They vary in their ac-
counts of the ethical justification of informed consent in the abstract, as
well as how it should be executed in real situations. But none of them
offers justification for the methods some states use to discourage abor-
tion through biased counseling laws. On the contrary, the worst features
of these laws are condemned as unethical on every account of informed
consent that I am aware of. Their utter failure to be ethically justified
according to a diversity of theories shows how far outside the bounds of
medical ethics these laws are.
In arguing against certain mandatory disclosures, I am not con-
tending that anything should be hidden from patients. The professional
obligation of informed consent and generally-applicable informed con-
sent laws require that accurate and material information about risks,
benefits, and alternatives be disclosed to all patients. For example, be-
cause the evidence shows that abortion does not cause psychological
problems, such problems should not be mentioned to all abortion pa-
tients. However, some patients may present with preexisting risk factors,
such as prior mental illness or a history of being victimized by violence.
2 (2007), available at http://www.acog.org/ResourcesAndPublications/
CommitteeOpinions/Committee-onEthics/PatientTestingIssues-in Selection_
andCounseling (follow "PDF Format" hyperlink), reaff'd in 2009.
386. ACOG OPINION ON INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 375.
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Such a case may require a warning about negative psychological seque-
lae, in the judgment of the health care provider. A parallel warning
about the psychological consequences of continuing an unwanted preg-
nancy would presumably also be indicated, as well as discussion of the
emotional toll of an unwanted pregnancy itself. Another reason that op-
position to mandatory disclosures does not entail keeping patients in the
dark is that the general requirement of informed consent gives patients
the power to ask questions, which must be answered truthfully and
completely. In sum, the goals that biased counseling laws putatively fur-
ther are already served by generally applicable informed consent
requirements, both legal and ethical.
Abortion opponents have attempted to co-opt the doctrine of in-
formed consent to further their political goal of reducing the number of
abortions. In doing so, they have tapped into a discriminatory vision of
women's decision-making ability, characterizing women as relatively in-
capable of rational, responsible decision making and in need of special
guidance from the state regarding the exercise of their reproductive
rights. This vision should be rejected, as should the cynical use of the
banner of informed consent to disguise an anti-abortion agenda. As I
have shown, there are features of biased counseling laws that cannot be
part of ethical informed consent practices because they are designed to
make women's choices regarding ending their pregnancies less well-
informed and less voluntary, all in the hope of discouraging abortions. t
[Vol. 19:170
